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Introduction
In a landmark speech to the Gulf Cooperation Council in November 1999, the
former Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia delivered an address that demonstrated a marked shift in Saudi foreign
policy. “The world today, despite conflicts and differences, is marching steadily toward
open markets and borders in an all embracing tide of globalization,” the King stated.“We
observe this tide and realize that we should not simply drift along with it as spectators.
Instead, we should hasten to become part of it. The fast pace of economic changes taking
place in the world does not allow us to move at the same old leisurely pace.
This royal announcement illustrated the major shift in domestic and foreign policy
the Royal Family - descendants of the founding father of Saudi Arabia Abd al Aziz ibn
Sa’ud, oftentimes deemed Abdul Aziz by Western scholars - experienced near the turn of
the millennium. Saudi Arabia, for the first time in the country s 74-year existence,
sought to embrace increased international trade and the world economy as a path for
slow, gradual economic growth. In August 1999 by Ministerial Order No. 111, the King
foreshadowed this shift by issuing a decree that established the Supreme Economic
Council. In that order, he noted how “rapidly changing economic developments at the
local and international levels require, more than at any previous time, that governments
focus on creating an effective, productive national economy that can meet their particular
needs.

Further clarifying the government’s role in stimulating economic growth, Fahd

revealed the cornerstone on which Saudi socioeconomic stability was built, consistent
economic growth. “Saudi Arabia’s economic policy is ... committed to providing steady
economic growth at an appropriate level to achieve a real increase in per capita income ..
. in order to ensure the security, welfare, and prosperity of society.
For the better part of three decades, the Saudi government has sought to create
sustainable economic growth through centralized government planning and the dispersal
of oil revenues to modernize the country’s social and economic infrastructures. To
Western scholars, however, those efforts have proved largely unsuccessful. As the
world’s largest oil exporter and possessor of roughly one-quarter ot the world s proven
oil reserves, Saudi Arabia took advantage of sharp rises in oil prices in the 1970s and
' Quote obtained from the official website of King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz. <-http://w\\'w.kingtahdbinabdulaziz.com/ ^
’ Quote obtained from Ministerial Decree No. 111. acce.ssed from the official website of the Supreme F.conomic Council of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, <http://www.sec.gov.sa/>.
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amassed hundreds of billions of dollars in government revenues.^ On the surface, the
country seemed rich beyond its years by 1980 with a per-capita income of$20,900 and
several development programs underway designed to provide Saudi citizens with new
economic opportunities for the future."*
But over the next two decades, centralized government efforts proved unable to
maintain and build upon Saudi economic success largely due to, according to many
Western scholars, the very nature in which the country first received its national wealth.
By 2001, sagging oil prices and a rapidly growing population lowered per-capita GDP to
$12,200, including a drop in real per-capita oil revenues irom $22,589 in 1980 to $4,564
in 2004. Western scholars, consequently, began to question the sustainability of the
Saudi economic system.^ By the turn of the millennium, the country was experiencing a
crisis of development. Increasing sociopolitical tensions that were exacerbated by high
unemployment and economic stagnation spawned a rise in social conservatism that
resented the absolute rule of the Royal Family and threatened to disturb the delicate
balance in Middle Eastern relations. It is in this context that King Fahd addressed Saudi
Arabia’s fellow Gulf states in his November 1999 address, and it is in this context that I
analyze the major questions regarding the Saudi path to modernization, why was the
Royal Family unable to build upon its 1970s success when it had all the capital it needed
to do so, how has the country reached this current economic crisis, and what potential
paths of development exist for the country to achieve its stated economic goals.

An Easy Choice
For the former King Fahd and, at the time of his 1999 address, his younger
brother Crown Prince Abdullah, who replaced his brother as King in 2005, the decision to
reform Saudi economic policy was an easy one. Real oil prices, which drove economic
growth so effectively in the 1970s, had gone into a two-decade decline during the 1980s
and 1990s, and the government’s windfall profits from the 1970s quickly dwindled as the
costs of improving the country’s infrastructure mounted. To offset the fall in oil prices,
the government ran budget shortfalls from 1982 to 1999 to maintain its financial

’ Figures obtained from U.S. Department of State. <http://wmv.state.gov/r/pa/ci^gn/3584.htm>.
■* StatLstics obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. <wv\'\v.eia.gov
’ Ibid.
Modernization has come to have several different meanings and connotations over the last several decades. In this context, efforts at
moik'mization simply mean government policies implemented to create an economy that is able to adapt to slow, gradual growth;
accordingly, these efforts can take the form of social or political change, since the key concept to modernization rests in the
interconnectedness of social behavior, economic perfonnance. and political institutions.
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commitment to modernizing the country’s infrastructure, sustaining its defensive military
capabilities, and providing its country with an extensive social welfare system. By 1999
at the age of 76, King Fahd recognized, as most other economic experts had already
forewarned, the Saudi economy was unsustainable in its present state. Continued
government commitment to existing development programs would not spawn economic
growth without a dramatic increase in oil prices, and tliat very dependence on oil created
an economy that was neither capable of slow, gradual growth nor sustainable over the
long-term future. To further compound the government’s problems, the high growth rate
of the Saudi population coupled with lagging international oil prices created high
unemployment and a rapidly shrinking GDP per capita, leaving the government with little
choice but to embrace the economic ideas of increased international trade, foreign direct
investment, and private sector development. For the economy to continually grow, Saudi
leaders recognized that the country would have to change, both socially and
economic
economically.^ Fahd, in accordance with his goal of obtaining consistent
growth, re-committed the government to modernizing reform and reiterated the Saudi
belief that the economic policy of the Kingdom was designed to increase the country s
social well being while preserving its traditional Islamic beliefs.
For many Western scholars, the shift in Saudi policy is a long-awaited admission
that consistent economic growth cannot be maintained without corresponding changes in
a country’s social and political behavior.^ For decades, oil-rich Saudi Arabia seemed to
serve as the exception for these Western scholars, labeled modernization theorists. By
1980, the country was as rich as many Western European countries in terms of GDP per
capita, but examination of the country’s sociopolitical indicators demonstrate that it
,10

remained a ‘traditional society,

Yet a mere two decades later, on the back of lagging

oil prices and budget shortfalls, the economy failed to show signs of consistent growth,

’Ministerial Order No. 111 (SFC).
D'lgby Udstone,"A C\ear OhiectivCy" The Middle East Economic Digest(2005). 49.
. ,● ● ,
'* Western scholarship, in this paper, refers to classical economic thought often associated wit 11 e economic, socia . an po itica
transformations experienced in the United States and Western Europe throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Likewise tor
the term ‘West.’ which refers to the most advanced democratic, capitalist countries like The United States and those in Western
Europe.
Modernization theorists argue that true stability lies in slow, consistent economic growth, and countries that wish to obtain that
stability follow a linear, unidirectional line from tradition to modernity. ‘Traditional society, in this context, refers to a socier> that
has cultural characteristics that stand in direct opposition to a modem one capable of maintaining slow, consistent economic growth.
Characteristics of traditional society include lack of diversified labor, gender inequality, political rule based on a mandate from
heaven.' el eeleni.
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and by the turn of the millennium, most economic experts deemed the economy
unsustainable.*’
These same experts argued that the country needed major economic, social, and
political reforms to achieve Fahd’s stated goal of steady economic growth, and the
interconnectedness of Saudi culture with the economy it was trying to create became
evident. To most modernization theorists, the problem was clear: the country possessed
traditional economic, social, and political bamers that inhibited the creation of a truly
modem economy,

Economically, the country was too oil-dependent to maintain growth

when oil prices declined in real terms, did not experience a net inflow of investment from
1970 to 2004, and maintained low levels of economic growth in the non-oil sectors of the
economy. Socially, the distinct rise of conservatism following government efforts at
modernization, high levels in the birth rate and lingering gender inequality, and low
levels of internet and mobile phone proliferation did not demonstrate a society that was
knowledgeable, open to change, and valued innovation. Politically, the country remained
an absolute monarchy with no input from individual citizens,jailed peaceful political
dissidents, and had no outlet for its non-violent opposition. Additionally, modernization
theorists contended that the individual, and not the government, would have to become
the key player in the economy, although this could not occur without a corresponding
social transformation that would affect the country’s polity and the population s
organizational behavior,

Put simply, these experts argued that the Royal Family’s

stated economic goals did not match Saudi society’s values nor were they reinforced with
political institutions that allowed individuals to hold their leaders accountable.
All of the indicators in these three areas reflect structural problems that explain
Saudi Arabia’s inability to grow economically once it received the needed capital in the
1970s. Because of the manner in which Saudi Arabia received its national wealth inflated oil revenues paid to the central government based on the work of thousands of
foreign workers - the country had no impetus to match its per-capita wealth with
economic or cultural changes. Efforts at modernization, instead of arising out of the
individual, were designed and controlled by the state through government revenues,
consequently, society became insulated from the outside world and, at the most
" F.liyahu Kanovsky.“The Woeflil State of Saudi Finances,” The Jerusalem Letter(\995Y 3
'■ Ibrahim A. F.lbadawi, “Reviving Growth in the Arab World.” Economic Development and Cultural ( lianae 53 (2005): 203.
” Peter N. Steams. “Modernization and Social History: Some Suggestions, and a Muted Cheer." Journal of Social History 14 (1080):
180.
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fundamental level, was not pushed to reform. As oil revenues remained persistently high
during the 1970s and early 1980s, Saudi leaders were able to use oil revenues to keep
their society insulated while also fostering economic growth. However, when oil
revenues began to decline in real terms, the country’s social insulation became one of the
inhibiting factors preventing leaders’ economic goals of consistent growth.
By the mid-1980s, the world’s two oil shocks the decade before had skewed the
country’s economic indicators such that Saudi Arabia seemed more developed
economically than its social and political indicators suggested. For modernization
theorists, Saudi failure to grow is explained by its unusual acquisition of wealth. The
Saudis did not follow the typical path of Western development - one of mass
mobilization, industrialization, specialization, and mass consumerism - that gradually
transforms society from the bottom-up; instead, they stockpiled profits from two oil
windfalls, and government leaders attempted to use those profits to modernize the entire
counti-y from the top-down in a span of thirty years. The process was as unnatural as it
was ineffective, and the Saudi economic “success” story has proven incomplete. Oil
revenues, as the past two decades have shown, are no longer the sole answer to Saudi
problems, and the Royal Family is using new solutions to approach its decades-old
problem of sustainable development. The government is now seeking a more
conventional path of modernization, and with it a rise in private sector development, to
diversify its economy and create steady economic growth that necessitates a
transformation in both social and political values that promote stability. The Saudi path
to modernization - a story thus far of short-term economic success and long-term
economic uncertainty - conforms to the main arguments of the modernization concept.
While individual modernization theories have experienced their fair share of
criticism, this paper is meant neither to prove nor disprove the validity of modernization s
universal claims. Its purpose is, however, to examine why the Saudi government has
experienced so many obstacles in its goal to achieve consistent economic growth and
why the country is facing its current crisis of economic sustainability, especially after it
received all the capital it needed to create sustainable growth after the 1970s oil shocks.
In light of the recent hurdles Saudi society has faced after the government s massive
development projects, this paper also proposes potential paths for future development
based on the interconnectedness of various aspects of Saudi society. While the
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modernization concept may not be completely accurate in describing all forms of national
development at all points in time, it is consistent in describing Saudi progress, or the lack
thereof, from the country’s founding in 1932 to the present.

Laying the Foundation: the Modernization Concept
Since the end of the Second World War,studies of“modernization” and
“development” have been at the forefront ofthe social sciences, and much of this work
has guided research in economics, sociology, political science, and social anthropology.
In an attempt to chart the economic development in Third World countries that were
allied with American capitalism during the Cold War, American economist Walt W.
Rostow popularized the modernization concept in his 1959 work The Stages of
Economic Growth.” In that work, he laid the basic claims of his modernization theory:
Western countries were the most developed, and the rest of the world, consisting mainly
offormer colonies of the imperialist West, were in earlier stages of development but
would eventually acquire similar characteristics as the Western world. Although
Rostow’s modernization theory has received intense - albeit justifiable - criticism since
its formulation, its basic presuppositions have yet to receive their definitive academic

burial.

These basic presuppositions form the cornerstone of the modernization

concept: national development is both linear and unidirectional, meaning that they
progress exclusively from traditional to modem societies, and stability is dependent upon
the ability to adapt to gradual, continual change.'^
At the very heart of its attempt to organize commonly experienced phenomena
into some coherent pattern, the modernization concept encapsulates the
interconnectedness of social organizations, economic institutions, and political stmctures.
Although all modernization theorists do not all agree on the specificity of development,
there is general agreement that modernization is a type of social change that is both
transformational in its impact and progressive in its effects. It is also so extensive

in

scope that it reaches virtually every institution ofsociety in such a way that
transformations in one institutional sphere produce complementary changes in others.

'●■steams 1980; 189.
'' W. W. Rostow. “The Stages of Fconomic Growth,” The Economic History Review 12 (1959); 2.
Dean C. Tipps, “Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study ot Societies; A Critical Perspective. ( ompai alive Siiuiies in
Society and Histon- 15(197.1): 208.
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Accordingly, modernization is generally understood as “a multifaceted process involving
17

changes in all areas of human thought and activity.
Throughout its evolution as a development paradigm, various authors have put
forth a number of distinct modernization theories that vary in their focuses on the
economic, social, or political spheres as the main points for change. These specific
theories have been the subject of widespread criticism from all types of social scientists
and economists because of their uses of the modernization concept to construct specific
frameworks that have proved easily refutable. The early formulators of the concept were
so naively American that they assumed their form of modernization theory provided a
checklist that in fact describes whether a non-Westem society is becoming more Western
18

or not.

Likewise, other theorists use the term ‘modernization so loosely that that it

becomes a “catchall, meaning little more than that as human and social behaviors have
neared the present, they became more modem,” or a commonly misunderstood causal
19
With such criticism.
statement - thus-and-such happened because society modernized,
the fact that the modernization concept exists at all in academic literature must be a
tribute to the seeming inescapability of the conclusion that something like modernization
occurred.

,20

And, in fact, the tme modernization concept incorporates a set of descriptive
21

categories meant to organize experiences into coherent patterns.
At least one historian notes that ideas of modernization lead to a flexible
conceptual framework that, when applied to a particular society, offers an historical
perspective to analyze the interconnectedness of economy, society, and politics.

It is

this interrelatedness that makes the framework of modernization applicable to nonWestem as well as Western societies, not its emphasis upon one universal historical
evolution, This conceptual framework consists of five points, which describe the social
focal points that provide the impetus for modem change. They include (1)the
establishment of categories that describe the organization of society or important
segments of it,(2)the broad definition of the direction that change can be expected to
have within these single categories,(3)the hypothesis that change within one category
will be related in varying degrees to change in the others,(4)the assumption that various
Samuel P Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale Univ, 1968. 52.
"'Ihid: 189.
''*/hid: 189.
-"Steams 1980: 189.
Ihid: 190.
■” Raymond Grew. "More on Modernization." Journal of Social History 14 (1980): 182.
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social groups will participate in, adapt to, or resist changes in the categories most relevant
to them, and (5)the identification in these terms of new or changing patterns of social
organization and behavior."^ This framework, properly applied to a society “undergoing
fairly rapid and self-conscious change,” is useful in describing the social, economic, and
political barriers in Saudi Arabia that have prevented leaders’ efforts in their stated goal
of creating sustainable economic growth.""*
That is not to say, however, that the modernization concept has not received valid
criticisms that offer ways it can be improved. First, critics argue that the modernization
concept should be applied to economically poor countries with the utmost discretion,
since “traditional” society, from which modernization emerges and is contrasted with, is
not constant, nor does change necessarily assume a single direction. However, the last
two centuries have witnessed remarkably similar worldwide developments, in
demographic, economic, and political forms, and one may still be able to use common
trends of Western development as a way to predict the issues confronting non-Westem
countries in their development experiences. Second, critics note how modernization is
too teleological by portraying Western development as necessarily good and an end in
itself to social problems. However, in today’s academic literature, the term
‘modernization’ is made neutral by examining both the favorable and unfavorable effects
- in a cost-benefit analysis - that modernization has had on Western society. The
corresponding results then allow one to analyze the value, in terms of gains and losses, of
modernization’s effects. Accordingly, even in its most abstract terms, modernization is
much more than simply an “onward-and-upward historical model ; it embraces the
“tensions among values and between values and institutions that allow a complex
„25

dialectic to emerge,

Third, critics say modernization is too static and, once the

preconditions for change exist, the society is on an inevitable path for modernization.
While the modernization concept posits these developments as typical trends of the
modernization process, it does not predict the exact rate or extent of change, nor does it
26

neatly replace traditional societies with an unexamined periodization of progress.
Modernization, conversely, is an interrelated process that describes the integration of
structures that become modem society. Lastly, critics argue that the last two centuries
■'ibid: 182.
-Uhid: 183.
Steams 1980; 191.
■'●Grew 1980: 183.
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have been filled with major social and economic transformations, and to group all
socioeconomic development into one scientific concept is as absurd as it is vague. What
these findings fail to suggest is that the modernization concept is complex, despite its
superficial simplicity, and as an integrating device, it traces the transformation of national
structures and public belief along similar trends of development to reveal the increasing
interrelatedness of economy, society, and politics.
With this framework in mind, the modernization concept posits trends of
development that progress from traditional to modem. Traditional society is depicted as
static, with little differentiation or specialization, a predominance of mechanical division
of labor, and a low level of urbanization and literacy. In contrast, modem society is
portrayed as possessing a very high level of differentiation, a high degree of division of
labor, specialization, urbanization, literacy, and exposure to mass media, it also possesses
a continual drive toward progress, an idea founded in modernization s notion of
consistent econornic growth as the means of stability. In the political realm, traditional
society is seen as based on elites mling by some mandate of Heaven,” while modem
society is based on wide participation of the masses who do not accept the traditional
legitimization of rulers and hold these mlers accountable in terms of secular values of
justice, freedom, and efficiency.^' Above all, traditional society is conceived as bound by
its inlierited cultural horizons, modem society as culturally dynamic and oriented to
28

change and innovation.
At the intellectual level, modem society is characterized by the tremendous
accumulation of knowledge about man’s environment and by the diffusion of knowledge
29
In
throughout society by means of literacy, mass communications, and education,
contrast to traditional society, modem society also involves much better healthcare,
longer life expectancy, and higher rates of occupational and geographical mobility. In
the cultural sphere, the process of modernization has been characterized by a growing
differentiation of the major cultural and value systems, such as religion, philosophy,
science, the spread of literacy and secular education, and a more complex institutional
system for the cultivation and advancement of specialized roles based on intellectual

Rostow 1959: 7.
Samuel P. Huntington,“The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and PoUticsr Comparaiiye PoUtk s 5 (1971): 2S6
Jo.seph S. Szyliowicz. “The Pro.spects for Scientific and Technological Development in Saudi Arabia, hifernaiional Journal of
MkhUe East Studies 10(1979): 356.
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disciplines.’^ These developments are made available by expanding media
communication and wider participation in cultural activities by the population as a
31

whole.

Economically, there is a diversification of activity as a few simple occupations

give way to many complex ones; the level of occupational skill and the ratio of capital to
labor are much higher than in traditional society. Politically, modem polity is
characterized by a rationalized authority, differentiated stmcture, mass participation, and
32

a consequent capability to accomplish a broad range of social and economic goals.
This divide between tradition and modernity notes the similar changes that have
occurred in individual societies - in demography, modes of production, technology,
- and so it has been with
urbanization, communication, political mobilization, et cetera
Saudi Arabia. Modem Saudi history, beginning with the ascendancy of the A1 Sa ud clan
in 1902, continually repeats the theme of cultural evolution from the traditional to the
modem. This progression, not surprisingly, has been the goal of Saudi leaders since the
country’s founder Abdul Aziz foresaw economic modernization as the Saudis hope for
33

the future, according to Saudi historian Madawi al-Rasheed.

It is at this point that the

modernization concept becomes applicable to both the Saudi past and present, the
country, it seems, has been fighting a continuous battle for sustainable growth for the last
half-century, and King Fahd’s 1999 address made it abundantly clear that oil revenues,
despite their seeming splendor and worth, were not the ultimate solutions Saudi leaders
had hoped they would be. The modernization concept, with its goal of stabilizing
economic growth, thus becomes pertinent when analyzing the key questions regarding
Saudi development: why has the massive influx of oil revenues failed to create a modem
economy and society capable of maintaining sustainable economic growth, how has the
country reached this current crisis of development, and what impact has the country s
recent reforms had on the prospects for future long-term development?

David C. McClelland.“Does Education Accelerate Economic Growth?" Ecomunic Derelopineni and C nltural C hange 14 (l‘)66).
258.
*' S.N. Eisen.stadt. “Studies of Modernization and Sociological Theory." Hisuny and Theory 13(1974): 226.
Zchra F. Arat. “Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited. C omparative Politics 21 ( I98S): 22
” Madawi al-Rasheed..4 History ofSaudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press (2002). 39.
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SECTION I

Saudi History
Chapter One.

From Tribal Groups to Desert Kingdom

Chapter Two

.The Source of Wealth

Throughout the last centwy ofSaudi histojy, the theme oflinear economic development
can be seen in the progression ofthe countiy's institutions. Chapter One outlines the
basic history ofSaudi culture, whose effects are still widely seen today, and discusses the
process ofstateformation that transformed the tribes ofthe Arabian Peninsula into a
nation-state. Chapter Two analyzes the international conditions leading to the 1970s oil
shocks and discusses the source ofSaudi wealth. This wealth, modernization theorists
note, was not the result ofa natural linear progression likely two be repeated in the
future, but two economic anomalies that seiwed to benefit the Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia s
government; that wealth, as will be proved in Section II, proved unsustainable without
corresponding changes in the countiy *s economy and society, proving the claims ofthe
modernization concept.

12

Chapter One: From Tribal Groups to Desert Kingdom
Setting the Stage: Saudi Arabia’s Early Historical Background
A relatively high level of material wealth characterized civilization in southern
Arabia beginning in ancient times. In 1000 B.C.E., the region was evolving rapidly as
trade routes across Eurasia brought steady contact from the outside world, and the
region’s abundance of frankincense and myrrh funneled wealth onto the Arabian
Peninsula. A thousand years later, a war between the Persians and the Romans for
control of the Near East benefited Arabic society from increased trade and the exchange
of ideas that accompanied camel caravans. Serving as a land-bridge between Egypt, the
Roman Empire, and the Far East, southern Arabia progressed rapidly despite its arid
climate and continual wars among rival clans. With the birth of the Prophet Muhammed
in Mecca in A.D. 570, the region experienced its first semblance of unity and peace.
Muhammed taught monotheism - the existence of only one God,of whom he was a
prophet - and was consequently expelled from Mecca, the religious center of the Arabian
peninsula, by leaders who benefited from pilgrims traveling to the city to worship its
many idols. Muhammed’s flight to Medina became known as the hijra, the flight, and is
regarded by Muslims as the first year of the Islamic calender. He soon became master of
Medina, converted many ofthe inhabitants of the city, and expelled those residents who
refused to accept the revelations he offered them. He then waged war on the leaders of
Mecca, and after a long struggle, the Meccans relented and accepted Islam. Muhammed
then revealed the tenets of Islam in The Pillars ofthe Faith, which served to unify the
region through common behavior and belief and included daily prayers, a public
statement of faith, a pilgrimage to Mecca, fasting during the month ofRamadan, and
34

obligations to give alms to widows, orphans, the poor, and the needy.
Until the seventh century, the peninsula’s tribes had fought a destructive series of
wars for control of the region. The situation had changed dramatically by the time of
Muhammad’s death in A.D. 632. Muhammad,as well as his political successor Abu
Bakr, enjoyed the loyalty of almost all of Arabia. Abu Bakr used force and coercion to
form an even stronger alliance of Arab tribes and demanded conversion to Islam from
followers of old polytheistic religions. Upon Muhammed’s death, Abu Bakr instituted

Scyyed llossein Nasr. Islam Religion. Hisioty. ami Civilization, San Francisco. CA: Harper (2003). 40
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the caliphate, a system designed to organize the Islamic community by creating a clearcut leader. Through this system, the Islamic community, largely based in present-day
35

Saudi Arabia, expanded as one of the dominant powers in the region.
Throughout the Middle Ages, Islamic tension and tribal conflicts fractured
Islamic unity and halted the region’s expansion. Although the caliphate remained largely
intact until the tenth century, continuing theological differences and religious strife forced
many Muslim scholars out of southern Arabia. As a result, the Islamic center of power
began to shift from Mesopotamia and southern Arabia to Egypt, Turkey, central Asia, and
India, where scholars were welcomed. At the same time, the system of the caliphate
began to break down; Islamic sub-groups began to disagree on caliphs’ successions, and
the region was consumed by civil conflicts. Two distinct sects ofIslam emerged in
southern Arabia during the tenth century: the first was centered in the western city of
Hajiz and developed a cosmopolitan quality because of the foreign traffic that continually
moved through the city; the second was based in the eastern city of Najd, an important
link between Baghdad and Mecca, and was more conservative because of the city s
isolation. The city of Najd would later become crucial in the emergence of the Saudi
36

state because of the initial rise of Wahhabi Islam there and, with it, the A1 Sa ud clan.
The A1 Sa’ud family emerged as the dominant factor in Saudi Arabia s modem
history beginning in the eighteenth century. The rise of the A1 Sa’ud coincided with that
of the Muslim scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, who wrote and preached against
leaders and traditions that he deemed contradictory to the idea of a unitary god. In 1744,
Wahhab swore a traditional oath with Muhammad ibn Sa’ud to work together in order to
establish a state ruled according to Islamic principles. From 1830 to 1891, the Al Sa ud
maintained power and protected Arabia’s autonomy by playing the British and Ottomans
against one another.

Foreign threats were largely repelled, but internal strife plagued

the Al Sa’ud throughout much of the century. Infighting and constant civil war
38

ultimately led to the decline of the Al Sa’ud and the rise of the rival Al Rashid family.
In 1891 Abd ar Rahman and the remainder of the Al Sa’ud were driven out of the citystate of Riyadh and forced to take refuge in neighboring Kuwait.

U.S. Library of Congress. 2005 Federal Research Div., <http://lcweb2.loc.gOv/ffd/c.s/profiles/Saudi Arabia.pdf^.
Al-Ra.sheed 2002: 30.
U.S. Library of Congress (2005).
Al-Rashecd 2002: 39.
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The Emergence of a Nation: 1902-1932
Abdul Aziz, the eldest son of Abd ar Rahman, began laying the groundwork for
the modem state of Saudi Arabia while exiled in Kuwait. In 1902 he took the Al-Rashid
garrison in Riyadh, successfully gaining a foothold in the conservative eastern territory of
Saudi Arabia. From there, Abdul Aziz stressed his Wahhabi connections and established
himself as the A1 Sa’ud leader and Wahhabi imam, or Muslim cleric. By forging
agreements with tribes around Riyadh, Abdul Aziz strengthened his position and, over
the next 25 years, gradually extended his authority as the Al-Rashid clan fought against
the Central Powers in the First World War and depleted themselves of military strength.
After the First World War, Abdul Aziz organized his military strength around radical
ikhwan forces, Wahhabi desert warriors who eagerly fought non-Wahhabi Muslims, and
39

waged war on the weakened Al-Rashid clan.
With victory achieved, Abdul Aziz set out to consolidate the Arabian tribal
groups into a nation by maintaining a delicate balance between religion, upon which he
40
based his legitimacy, and modernization, which he saw as the future, In the Wahhabi
idea of the state, Abdul Aziz found a “conceptual framework crucial for the consolidation
„41

of his rule.

The mler was granted legitimacy from Wahhabi clerics as long as he

continued to champion the cause of ritualistic Islam, and his legitimacy sprang from the
recognition ofshari'ah law, a divine law above man and independent of his will. As long
as Abdul Aziz allowed himself to be ruled by this law and the way it was interpreted by
the Wahhabi religious leaders in Riyadh, he was able to mle absolutely. Such concepts
of authority and power “were crucial for promoting ambitious leadership.”^" By the
country’s formal founding in 1932, Abdul Aziz had become a significant leader for all
Islamic peoples, but he faced immediate problems of economic development as the Great
Depression placed severe constrictions on the country’s meager resources throughout the
43

1930s.

The Source of Development: Oil’s Discovery and the Birth of a Nation
From 1932 until Abdul Aziz’s death in 1952, state formation and the continual
increase in wealth dominated Saudi development. At the time of the foiTnal founding of
U.S. Library of Congress, 1992 Federal Research Division, <http://rs6.loc.gov/frd/cs/satoc.html>.
Al-Rasheed 2002: 39.
"Al-Ra.sheed 2002: 40.
Ihid: 51.
Ibid-. 55.
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Saudi Arabia in 1932, Abdul Aziz desired to create a system of stable succession by
formalizing his direct descendants into a royal lineage to provide continuity at the level of
leadership. Abdul Aziz achieved stable succession by creating an aristocracy out of the
great number of his direct descendants; the leader is rumored to have had hundreds of
children from dozens of wives, although he limited himself towards the end of his life by
44

only taking on tw^o new wives per year and maintaining only four at a time,

Three

generations later, the Royal Family consists of thousands of princes, all who have a direct
claim to Abdul Aziz as father, grandfather, or great grandfather. Abdul Aziz was able to
accomplish this by placating his political rivals; he often intermarried between faction
clans and intermingled birth lines to such a degree that few clans could call the King an
enemy without condemning several of their own family members.
By the early 1930s, Abdul Aziz had a considerable debt of over _300,000, largely
because of his royal lavishness and the military expenditure required to pacify his ikhwan
forces after the country was consolidated. This led him to grant a major concession in
1933 to the American oil company Standard Oil of California(SOCAL)to begin the
exploration of oil and water. In 1938, SOCAL hit oil at well Dammam No. 7, which
began to produce crude in commercial quantities in 1939. Oil from Saudi wells increased
45

from 0.5 million barrels in 1938 to 21.3 million barrels in 1945.

The discovery of oil

had dramatic effects on the country as a whole. Wealth, at first in minute amounts, began
to trickle into the country. ARAMCO,the Arabian American Oil Company formerly
known as SOCAL, began extensive projects designed to improve the country’s
infrastructure to facilitate oil extraction and shipment to overseas markets. Roads,
railways, power and water capabilities, ports, airports, and pipelines were constructed in
oil regions; schools, hospitals, and state administration agencies were added to more
underdeveloped parts of the country. The process of modernization had begun. State
revenues, in inflated terms, increased from 13.5 million dollars in 1946 to 212 million
dollars only six years later.
This first influx of wealth, which became more common and more pronounced as
oil production increased, sparked development projects by the central government.
Abdul Aziz, before his death in 1953, first used these increased revenues to build up
Saudi Arabia’s military, build new palaces for himself and his family, and timidly expand
Al-Rasheed 2002; 52
Library of Congress(1991).
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his government. The ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance were established in the
1930s and 1940s, respectively, and five new agencies were created in the early 1950s:
Interior, Health, Communication, Agriculture, and Education. Through his use of oil
revenues to spark modernizing reform, Abdul Aziz initiated a precedent that would be
imitated by Saudi leaders throughout the next five decades: improving the population’s
well being, according to Western trends of modernization, through development projects
funded by excess oil revenues. The extent ofthat modernization, however, was just
46

beginning to be realized.
TABLE r”
Government Revenues 1946-1952
Year

Revenues(in inflated dollars)

1946

$13.5 million

1950

$113 million

1951

$165 million

1952

$212 million

4/1

U S. Fnergy Infomiation Agency. 2005 Federal Research Division. <\v\v\v.eia.gov>.
^ Figures obtained from Al-Rasheed 2002; 94.
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Chapter Two: The Source of Wealth
OPEC and the Beginnings of Oil Wealth
"IVe attached little importance to it because we believed it would not work OPEC did not really exist.”
-Howard Page, a Standard Oil executive at thefounding ofOPECf^

In the late 1950s, oil-producing Arab countries were growing weary of Western
corporations artificially depressing oil prices by overproducing. The countries met in
Cairo in 1959 in the first Arab Petroleum Congress to decide upon a strategy to
implement should Western corporations continue to keep oil at an artificially low price.
When the price of oil had only marginally increased by 1960, Saudi oil minister Abdullah
al-Tariqi established the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC)in
September of that year to protect oil-producing countries from the energy glut that had
driven down oil prices. In an attempt to prevent a total collapse in oil prices, oil
companies cut production to maintain their profits, which in turn negatively affected the
economies of oil-producing nations. With the creation of OPEC, Al-Tariqi envisioned
the organization playing a leading role in stabilizing world energy markets, in preventing
economic waste, and in conserving oil as an irreplaceable resource. Consequently, while
al-Tariqi was oil minister, Saudi Arabia gave its full support to OPEC; the organization,
however, fell far short of fulfilling the oil minister’s visions. Instead, the organization
became a tool in the hands of the oil companies, who held concessions to the oil located
under Middle Eastern lands.
Despite OPEC’s minimal power, the 1960s became a decade of unprecedented
affluence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Slowly increasing oil prices and high
production levels led to increasing government revenues. Growing wealth, however, was
not synonymous with social progress, and by the time that King Faysal inherited the
throne from his older brother Sa’ud in 1964, Saudi Arabia, from the Western perspective,
was markedly underdeveloped. Faysal, long considered a modernist in Saudi history
books, sought to use oil revenues to build up the country’s infrastructure and make it
capable of sustainable economic growth."*^ In 1965, Faysal consolidated central
economic planning into the Central Planning Organization, which later became the
Ministry of Planning. The ministry’s purpose was to maintain slow, stable GDP growth
through five-year economic plans, the first of which was meant to create and develop the
Qtd. in Daniel Ycrgin. The Prize: the Epk Questfor Oil. Money, ami Power. Free Press; New York (1991), 523.
Al-Ra.sheed 2002: 121
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country’s material infrastructure and the government’s social services. The construction
of roads, airports, ports, electricity, and communication became priorities, as did the
establishment of schools and hospitals. Faysal’s promotion ofeducation in general, and
particularly female education, made his name “synonymous with modernization amidst a
„50

climate of political conservatism,

His wish to continue developing the country’s

infrastructure was reinforced by rising oil revenues, although no one foresaw the extent
of price increases in the early 1970s that would shape the Saudi Kingdom for decades to
come.

Treasure Unleashed: the First Oil Shock
"This is a momentfor which I have been waitingfor a long time. The moment has come. We are now
masters ofour own commodity."
-Saudi oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani at the enactment ofthe 1973 oil embargo.

Since the end of the Second World War, Western powers recognized the potential
of military conflict in the Middle East to disrupt the supply of oil to international markets.
The 1956 Suez Canal crisis, when Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the
Suez Canal Company,choked world oil shipments, and provoked a military response
from France, Britain, and Israel, proved that fear all too real. The first impetus for oil52

producers to use “oil as a weapon” occurred during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
Frustrated by Israeli success in the Suez Canal crisis, Egypt’s Nasser reiterated his calls
53

for the “liquidation” of Israel.

In May 1967, Nasser instituted a blockade against Israeli

shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba, cutting off its southern port of Eilat and threatening to
interrupt its supply of petroleum. He also sent Egyptian troops marching back into the
Sinai Peninsula, while King Hussein of Jordan put his armed forces under Egyptian
command. When Iraq and Syria adhered to the new Jordanian-Egyptian agreement on
June 4, Israel, faced with military might on all sides, felt the noose tightening quickly.
The next morning, June 5, Israel responded. Answering the Arab military build-up, Israel
launched a preemptive offensive attack and succeeded in destroying the entire air forces
of Egypt and other belligerent states while they were still on the ground. With local air
superiority assured, Israeli forces pushed back those of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq in a

'"//)/</; 122.
'' Quoted in Yergin 1991: f>06.
Ihitl 1991: 524.
'* thid. 554
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matter of days. By June 8, the Israeli Army had crossed the Sinai, destroying 80 percent
54

of the Egyptian military in the process, according to Nasser himself.
In response to impending military defeat, Arab oil ministers met on June 6 and
called for an all-out embargo of the United States, Britain, and, to a lesser degree. West
Germany. By June 8, the flow of Arab oil had been reduced by 60 percent. The situation
grew more threatening in late-June and early-July when civil war broke out in Nigeria,
one of America’s leading oil-suppliers, and oil output in that African nation dropped
sharply. Despite high anxiety and uncertainty among Western leaders, the problems
proved less severe than might have been expected, and the domestic tension in the Arab
countries soon ebbed. Arab oil-producers dropped their production to a maximum loss of
about 1.5 million barrels of oil per day, an amount that the U.S. was able to replenish
with its stockpiles and additional production elsewhere. By late-July 1967, merely a
month after the Six-Day War, it was clear “that the ‘Arab oil weapon’ and the ‘selective
„55

embargo’ were a failure.’

The biggest losers, ironically, turned out to be the countries

that instituted the embargos; they gave up substantial government revenues to no obvious
effect. Arab oil-producing nations, however, would not make that mistake again.
Although the Middle Eastern oil flow stabilized from 1967 to 1973, Arab
relations with Israel remained strained. Eager to make up for their poor military
perfonnance in the Six-Day War, Egypt planned a 1973 surprise attack on the holiest day
of the Jewish calendar: Yom Kippur. Feigning military build-ups throughout 1972 and
1973, the October 6 attack caught Israel completely off-guard. Finding themselves
unprepared for war, the Israelis fell back before the Egyptian and Syrian onslaught, while
those two nations scored massive victories. The Israelis, running low on supplies, faced a
quick defeat and requested immediate American assistance.
OPEC seized the opportunity to unilaterally demand Western oil companies raise
the price of oil 100 percent. Western companies, fearful of allowing OPEC sole authority
in setting oil prices, did not respond to the organization’s demand. On October 16, the
delegates of the Gulf states announced a 70 percent increase in the price of oil to $5.11 a
barrel, which brought its oil prices in line with those of the world market. The next day,
Arab oil ministers, eager to capitalize on their recent success, agreed to an embargo,
cutting production 5 percent each month until their objectives were met and agreeing that
Ihid. 555.
Ihid 557.
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the United States be the country most severely affected. By the time that American
President Richard Nixon publicly proposed his S2.2 billion military aid package for Israel
on October 19. the embargo was already in full effect. The next day Saudi Arabia
announced it had gone beyond the rolling cutbacks and had cut off all oil - every last
barrel

destined for American soil. "The oil weapon was now fully in battle - a weapon,
●.«56

in Kissinger's words, ‘of political blackmail. And now, all hell has broken loose.'

The

\'ci'y public nature of the American re-supply to Israel had a polarizing effect on many
Arab countries; "not to have acted, some Arab leaders thought, could have put certain
regimes at the mercy of street mobs.”^’
While Nixon and Kissinger fought for a military cease-fire and an end to the allout embargo, international markets experienced a new world of oil prices. After much
hard discussion in December 1973, Arab states agreed to set the price of oil at SI 1.65 a
5S

barrel, a four-fold increase in price from the S2.90 a ban'el oil cost in mid-1973.
Because oil was so vital to countries at the time, the demand for oil dropped only
marginally with severe increases in price, demonstrating its inelasticity as a commodity.
The quadrupling of prices triggered by the Arab oil embargo and the exporters’
assumption of complete control in setting prices brought massive changes to every corner
of the world economy.’'^ The combined petroleum earnings of oil exporters rose from
60

S23 billion in 1972 to S140 billion by 1977.
FIGURE I
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FIGURE II
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Figures I and II demonstrate the dramatic effect increased oil prices had on the
Saudi Arabian economy. The continual rise in nominal oil prices beginning in 1971 had
a pronounced effect on the country’s GDP beginning that same year. Yearly oil revenues
fueled more than a ten-fold increase in the Saudi GDP during the 1970s, giving the
government all the funds it needed to pursue its modernization goals. The Saudi
government built up such large financial surpluses, in fact, that their unspent money
created grave concern for the world’s bankers and economic policymakers; the unspent
tens of billions, sitting idly in bank accounts, could spell serious contraction and
dislocation in the world economy if they were not spent. Bankers’ fears, however,
proved unmerited. The oil exporters, finding themselves amidst a sudden wealth greater
than they could have dreamed, embarked on “dizzying programs” of spending.^^ With
the influx of wealth, expenditures increased accordingly, ports were clogged far beyond
their capacity, and ships waited weeks to be unloaded. “Everything was for sale to the oil
„64

producers, and now they had the money to buy.
Panic at the Pump: the Second Oil Shock
“Today weface a world crisis of vaster dimensions than Churchill described halfa centiny ago — made
more ominous by the problems ofoil. There is little, ifany, reliefin prospect. ... The energyfuture is
bleak and is likely to grow bleaker in the decade ahead.”
-U.S. Secretaiy ofDefense James Schlesinger in the summer of1979 ’

While oil-producing nations now had unprecedented wealth to spend on anything
that they desired, world oil markets were far from stabilized. The influx of oil revenues
destabilized Iran as the shah embraced massive reform efforts and encountered vicious
domestic backlash from religious conservatives. The petrodollars, spent on extravagant
modernization programs or wasted through corruption, were generating economic chaos
and sociopolitical tensions throughout the country. By 1976, the shah himself recognized
Iran had “acquired money it could not spend.”^^ Money, he had to admit, was not the
sole answer to his country’s problems. Meanwhile, reform programs had polarized the
population into pro- and anti-shah factions, and the shah’s lack of success in stabilizing
the chaos undennined his political support. The rural populace was flowing into the
already-overcrowded cities, and inflation had seized control of the economy. Iran’s
inflexible infrastructure could not cope with the pressure suddenly thrust upon it, and

Ycrgin 1991: 634.
thut 634
Quoted in Ihid. 698.
Ihid: 644.
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every system — from electricity to traffic to communications — broke down. The political
situation in the country deteriorated, and the shah refused to publicly wage war against
revolutionaries led by Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iranian oil industry degenerated into
chaos. Export oil production dropped from 4.5 million barrels per day in January 1978 to
under one million by November to none in January. The shah’s installed military
government was unable to halt the growing revolution, and on January 16, 1979, the shah
left Iran, in effect abdicating the throne.
The fact that the Iranian revolution led to a shortage in oil supply was no surprise.
Iran was, after all, OPEC’s second largest producer of oil at the time, behind only Saudi
67

Arabia.

However, the drop in supply was much more minimal than the world

anticipated. Saudi Arabia increased its oil output from its self-imposed ceiling of 8.5
million barrels per day to 10.5 million barrels to accommodate demand. Other OPEC
countries did the same, and actual shortage was no more than four to five percent of the
worldwide demand of 50 million barrels a day. Prices, however, did not match the
minimal drop in supply, as the world, already fearful of its dependence on Middle Eastern
oil, panicked. The four- to five-percent loss in supply resulted in an immediate 150
percent increase in demand on world markets. Buyers,fearing that the Iranian
Revolution, fueled by its religious fundamentalism and fervent nationalism, would spread
to neighboring Arab states, focused on building up stockpiles of oil inventories. By the
time the panic subsided, the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, as well as Iraq’s bombing of
the world’s largest oil refinery at Abadan, shook the oil market. Prices increased from
$14 a barrel in 1979 to $40 in 1980. By the time the dust had settled in 1982, Saudi
Arabia’s GDP, like most other oil-producing nations’ GDPs, had increased in inflated
terms from 40.5 billion Saudi riyals in 1971 to 415.2 billion in 1982, while inflated
government revenues jumped from $4.3 billion to $101.8 billion between 1973 and 1980.
The financial capital needed for development was now in Saudi hands, although exactly
68

how the Royal Family would use that excess money remained to be seen.

' U S. F.ncrgy Information Agency (2005).
All figures from this paragraph were obtained from Yergin 1991; 634-685.
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SECTION II

Modernization Concept
Chapter Three

The Quest for Sustainable Economic Growth

Chapter Four..

.Finding Social Identity

Chapter Five...

.Battling Political Complacency

By the early 1970s, the Saudi economic outlook had changed significantly. The Saudi
Royal Family, which had been plagued by budget constraints since the countiy's
founding in 1932, now had the wealth needed to modernize its economy. Government
efforts to reform, however, proved more difficult than Saudi leaders imagined. Funds
that were designed tofacilitate self-sustained economic growthfailed to provide
sufficient economic payback, and the Saudi balance ofpayments declinedfrom a
cumulative surplus of$163 billion in 1983 to a $138 billion deficit by 1992. The reasons
for thisfailure are explained by the modernization concept's notion that self-sustained
economic growth occurs through natural economic and social evolution that occursfrom
the bottom-up. To analyze how Saudi Arabia did notfollow typical Western Upends, this
section is divided into three chapters that analyze the country’s economy, society, and
polity. Each chapter is subdivided into three subsections, thefirst ofwhich discusses
government policy, the second analyzes the undermining effects that the massive infiux of
oil wealth had in creating sustainable economic growth, and the third section explains
how and why Saudi modernization efforts differfrom typical Western trends.
Additionally, the key to understanding Section II ofthis paper lies in distinguishing the
interconnectedness among the economy, society, and polity; the Saudi government,for
example, self-proclaimedly plays the defining role in creating a robust economy that
benefits the Saudi people, yet the countiy as a whole remains a society ofcontrasts torn
between Western development and its Islamic past. Few explanations ofthe
interconnectedness ofthese threefacets ofSaudi Arabia are more insightful than the
Libraiy ofCongress’s: “The economic philosophy ofthe Saudi Arabian Royal Family
has not changed since the reign ofAbd al Aziz, but the economic role ofthe government
has grown tremendously. The stated goal ofSaudi mlers has been to improve the
economic conditions ofthe countiy's citizens while retaining the society's Islamic values.
Imbedded in this social contract, however, is the issue ofpolitical control. The Al Sa 'ud
recognized that the key to political power in the Kingdom lay in replacing the old
economy with lucrative new economic opportunitiesfor the countiy's citizemy. ”

U S l ibrary of Congress (2005): 2.
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Chapter Three: The Quest for Sustainable Economic Growth
Government Policy-making: Coping with Success
"The quadntpling ofprices triggered by the Arab oil embargo and the exporters’assumption ofcomplete
control in setting those prices brought massive changes to eveiy corner ofthe world economy.... Oil
exporters built up vety largefinancial surpluses, and they, suddenly wealthy and certainlyfar richer than
they might have dreamed, embarked on a dizzying program ofspending: industrialization, infrastructure,
subsidies, scn iccs. necessities, liLXuries, weapons, waste, and corniption.... This massive spending
ensured that theirfinancial surpluses would soon disappear. And disappear they did., completely.”
70
-Daniel Yergin in his 1991 vvo/'A The Prize

In the early 1970s, the Saudi economic situation had changed dramatically. The
Royal Family, which had operated under severe budget constraints since Abdul Aziz
ascended to the throne in 1932, had watched the trickle of oil revenues in the 1950s
increase to an abundance in the 1970s. Saudi Arabia’s revenues per barrel of oil
skyrocketed from $0.22 in 1948 to $10 in 1974 to $34 in 1980, and the government was
facing increasing pressure on what to do with that money.^* Factions developed inside
the Royal Family between those eager to promote modernization programs and those
fearful of the social consequences rapid economic transformation could bring. The
underlying issue facing policy-makers became whether to limit oil production to a level
that was adequate to meet limited economic and social development or to allow for a
production scheme that would fluctuate to meet the world’s crude demand.^^ By 1974,
the choice had been made; the Saudis pledged to keep oil flowing at moderate prices,
arguing, in the words of the A1 Sa’ud, that the “‘Kingdom was as dependent on the
,„73

stability and prosperity of consuming nations as those nations were on Saudi oil.
From the very beginning of its oil prosperity, therefore, Saudi policy-makers did not
allow its domestic needs to govern its external oil policy.
The question confronting policy-makers then became simple: how were the
country’s oil export earnings best put to use? By 1974, the Royal Family had settled
upon an answer: the government would fund a massive development project aimed at
transforming Saudi Arabia into a first-world economy and society.^'’ Between 1973 and
1980, government oil revenues jumped from $4.3 billion to $101.8 billion, and these

"Yergin 1991:634.
' U S. Library of Congress(1991).
■ Yergin 1991; 622.
* Quoted in Library of C'ongress (2005).
* Obtaining a first-world economy and society, in this context, refers to the modernization concept's notion of creating a diversified
and self-sustaining economy supplemented by a society that is characterized by low unemployment, high CiDP por-capita, low levels
of poverty, high levels of education and literacy, and longer life-expectancies. The First World, then, refers to Western countries such
as the U.S.. Canada, the E.U.. Japan, Korea,el cetera.
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higher oil revenues “at last gave Saudi officials the means to make major structural
»75

changes to the country in a massive development effort.’

To accomplish that goal.

Saudi leaders promoted industrialization and improved the country’s social and economic
infrastructure. To industrialize, the government planned to invest in processing plants
that used the country's hydrocarbon resources to refine oil and produce natural gas. This
policy meant a decade of substantial investments to build the plants and necessary
infrastructure, such as a gas-gathering system, the pipelines for gas and crude oil that
would bring the raw material to the main industrial sites - A1 Jubayl and Yanbu al Bahr,
and building the industrial sites themselves. To develop the country’s social and
economic infrastructure, the government made huge financial commitments to
completely overhaul the country’s electricity, water, sewage, desalination,
telecommunications, and transportation systems. These efforts, which were designed to
support future domestic consumption, were also supplemented by subsidies designed to
encourage growth in the non-oil private sector and improved educational opportunities
and health services for all Saudis. These commitments proved so costly, however, that as
government revenues increased exponentially in the early 1970s, budget expenditures
rose comparably. OPEC’s $67 billion surplus in 1974, for instance, had turned into a $2
billion deficit by 1978. Meanwhile, the cumulative costs for the government’s massive
development project totaled more than $500 billion, in inflated terms, by the mid76

1980s.
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Table II
Saudi Arabia’s macroeconomic indicators in 1973 and 1980

Real GDP (total)
Nominal oil prices per barrel
Nominal oil revenues
Nominal GDP per capita

1973
$99.3 billion
$3.27
$4.3 billion
$6,625

1980
$149 billion
$32.27
$101.8 billion
$20,900

As oil revenues increased substantially, leaders hinted at using government
revenues to spawn future economic growth and improve tlie plight of Saudi citizens. To
oversee those aims. King Faysal established the Central Planning Organization in 1965,
which drafted the country’s first five-year development plan to be enacted from 1970 to
1975. This draft, which became known as the First Development Plan, sought to increase
“ Library ofC ongress (2005).
'■ Figures from this paragraph were obtained from the Library of Congress (1991).
Figures obtained from United Nations (2006) and World Bank (2006).
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the country’s real GDP by 9.8 percent per year and spur growth in the country’s non-oil
sectors. The planned budget was $9.2 billion over five years, 45 percent of which was to
be spent on capital projects of defense, education, transportation, and utilities. The
unanticipated increase in crude oil prices, however, led to rapid economic growth far
beyond the planners’ expectations. As oil revenues grew, the Royal Family more than
78

doubled the plan’s initial budget, committing $21 billion to development projects.
The Second Development Plan, from 1975 to 1980, recognized the dramatic
transformation the Saudi economic outlook had undergone only five years earlier.
Although it had similar social and economic goals as the first, the Second Development
Plan estimated government expenditures at $142 billion, more than fifteen times the
planned expenditures only five years before. The largest share of government
expenditure, 23 percent, was allocated for continuing the development of roads, ports,
and airports. The expansion of industry, agriculture, and utilities received 19 percent of
the plan’s budget, and defense and human resource development, mainly education,
received 16 percent each. The plan contained numerous social goals, including free
medical service, free education and vocational training, interest-free loans, extended
social security benefits, and support for the needy. Economically, the plan aimed to spur
a 13.3 percent per year increase in the non-oil sector of the economy and a 9.7 percent
increase per year in the oil sector. Additionally, the plan included development of the
capital Riyadh, largely a sentimental and political decision, which, in reality, required
large government expenditures to bring water, electricity, communications and housing
79

inland, far away from the true economic centers of the country,

Oil revenues continued

to rise throughout the 1970s, capped off by the 1979-81 oil shock. Fueled by overall real
GDP growth of 9.2 percent per year, actual government expenditures exceeded $200
billion, approximately forty percent above the initial government estimate and almost ten
times the actual expenditures in the first plan. Nevertheless, the Saudi economy,
continued to expand at a rapid pace, notching per o/mwm growth rates of 14.8 percent in
80

the non-oil sector and 16.6 percent in industrial production over this time period.
The Third and Fourth Development Plans curbed government spending at roughly
$240 billion over each five-year period, but the government quickly felt the increasing

Al-Rashccd 2002: 121
Library of'Congrcss (2005).
U S Department of State (2005).

27

constraint falling oil revenues were placing on the Saudi budget. The commercialization
of new oil reserv es in Mexico and the North Sea in the early 1980s, coupled with
decreasing worldwide demand for crude and increasing non-OPEC oil production,
stabilized, then depressed, oil's international price quickly. Saudi oil revenues fell from
$1 19 billion in 1981 to $36 billion in 1984 to $26 billion in 1985.^' The collapse of the
OPEC pricing cartel in 1986, and with it oil’s subsequent overproduction, continued the
commodity's downward price spiral to $12.52, only five years removed from its $35.10high in 1981

Meanwhile, the Saudi government, reeling from increasing domestic

pressure to halt the secularization of society, sought to slow the rapid pace of
development and limit domestic inflationary pressures. The economy, which had become
dependent on heavy government subsidies funded by oil revenues, went into recession as
a result. Real GDP declined 1.5 percent per year from 1980 to 1990 compared with an
83

estimated annual growth rate of 1.3 percent,

Policy-makers, attempting to foster growth

in The Fifth Development Plan from 1990-95, found their options limited due to
depressed oil prices and the government’s increasing domestic debt. Commitment to
84

civilian programs fell from $150 billion in the previous plan to $102 billion in the Fifth.
Meanwhile, the development of the private sector also became a priority, and the
government allowed individual investors to buy shares in its nationalized companies.
Additionally, there was greater emphasis on financial sector reform through the
85

establishment ofjoint stock companies and a stock market that could trade shares.
However, these refoims failed to spark significant growth while oil revenues remained
stagnant, and the economy’s real GDP in 1995 remained below its 1981 level.
Undermining the Future Economy
''Please excuse the comparison, hut the histoiy ofthe crisis is similar to that ofa pregnant wife. . .. The
crisis startedjust like a normal pregnancy — with passion andJoy. At this moment other members wanted
us to raise the price ofoil even higher despite our warnings ofthe negative consequences. Moreover,
every'one my/.v getting massivefinancial revenues and rushing into development projects as ifthisfinancial
revenue would continue to riseforever. . . . We were consumed w>ith our moments ofpleasure. Now, the
consequences must befaced."
-Saudi oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani in 1983, the year real oil prices started their two-decade decline

Beginning with the huge rise in expenditures in 1973, the government anticipated
problems related to development. The first ones seemed trivial enough; a flood of
Yergin 1991: 747
Figures from U.S. Departments ofF.nergy. Commerce, and Labor(2004).
Library of Congress (1991).
Ihici.
Ihut.
Quoted in Yergin 1991 : 720
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impcms in l ‘-)74 o\ cr\\ helmed the transportation system, and bottlenecks at the country’s
87

pt)ris kept ship etmtainers from being unloaded for months,

Then came the acute

housing shortages in the country's rapidly expanding cities, skyrocketing construction
88

costs, and the short suppK' of labor tliat dro\ e up wages exponentially by 1976.’

Stable

oil prices. Iu>\\ e\ er, kept the underl\ ing economic problems at bay. and renewed
gov ernment financial commitment to maintain social and economic cohesion in 1979
gUissed o\ er the true economic situation of the country. As long as oil prices remained
high, the government had the re\ enues to continue funding development projects.
But oil prices did not remain high. Beginning in 1981. real oil prices began a
t\\ t)-decade decline with the sole exception of the 1990-91 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that
drove up oil prices for a ten-month period, but even that price hike was offset by the
coiiHict's $59 billion price tag. an amount - $23 billion of which was paid by the Saudi
89

government

that dwarfed the high oil export earnings for the 1991 fiscal year,

More

important, however, a tw o-decade decline in the real price of crude oil revealed the
unsustainable manner in which the Saudi government had approached its modernization
efforts. Large gov eminent subsidies that spurred growth in the non-oil sectors ot the
economy during the oil boom of 1973-1984 disappeared over the next decade. The
hydrocarbon and natural gas industries, which the Saudi government had hoped would
help diversify the economy, proved more inefficient and less profitable than the
government anticipated.
r91

FIGURE III90

FIGURE IV
Saudi Real GDP from 1980 to 2006
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By 1985, the government found itself with little control over expenditures and
spending billions of dollars on projects that did not offer comparable economic paybacks.
The sudden easing of financial constraints in the mid-1970s permitted the consideration
and approval of development projects that, realistically, were too lavish and too large,
92

such as the combined $8.2 billion spent on the airports in Riyadh and Jiddah.

By 1990,

it had become evident that maintaining some of the investments made in the 1970s lacked
direct financial paybacks, and the government, which had extended social services in the
1970s through indirect subsidies, found itself hard-pressed to reduce those services
without harsh social backlash. It had also become clear that the government had failed in
its attempts to provide an adequate infrastructure for the future — one that it defined as
properly promoting private sector investment and supporting future domestic
consumption. With increasing financial constraints and a population that was growing
rapidly, Saudi Arabia’s per-capita real GDP decreased by a yearly average of 1.2 percent
93

from 1970 to 1990 and by 0.5 percent from 1990-2000.

Accordingly, the country is the

richest in the world, in terms of overall GDP,that has experienced a decrease in real percapita wealth from 1980 to the present. The country has also suffered from astonishingly
high unemployment rates; comprehensive figures on unemployment were not published
by the Royal Family in the past, but 2005 estimates range from official government
figures of9 percent to the World Bank’s and U.S. government’s 30 percent.
The explanation for this economic recession resides in the impact oil revenues had
on the economy. When the oil shocks drove up the price of oil twelve-fold from 1973 to
1981, oil’s percent make-up of the country’s government revenues, GDP,and export
earnings reached high levels for a country hoping to achieve sustainable growth through
diversification and specialization. Comprehensive statistics comparing oil’s past
percentages of government revenues, GDP,and export earnings are not available, largely
since oil was Saudi Arabia’s only major profitable export from 1932 to 1973. By 1981,
however, oil comprised 67.6 percent of the country’s GDP and more than 95 percent of
94

the country’s export earnings.

Even after the country’s two-decade-long project aimed

at developing the country’s infrastructure, fostering growth in the country’s private
sector, and diversifying the economy, oil still accounts for more than 90 percent of the

Ihul.
Human Dcvelopmenl Index Report (2005).
IhuJ V
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country’s export earnings, 75 percent of state revenues, and 40 percent ofthe country’s
95

GDP.

With the drop in real oil prices from 1983 to 1999, it is no surprise that the

country experienced an annual real GDP growth rate of0.5 percent over that same time
period. It is safe to say, then, that oil has served as the main engine behind Saudi
economic growth for the last three decades. Figures III and IV illustrate the relationship
between real oil prices and Saudi Arabia’s real GDP over the last quarter century.
Immediately after real oil prices peaked in 1981, Figure IV shows, they began a twodecade decline that reached their nadir in 1999; it is no surprise that Saudi real GDP also
climaxed in 1981 and did not surpass that mark until 2000, when oil prices began their
ascendancy once again.
Oil profitability also deterred private sector investment in the non-oil sector of the
economy. Two sets of data support this claim. First, unlike Western countries with
diversified, specialized economies, the Saudi economy maintains a private sector that
tends to move in a “pro-cyclical fashion” in relation to increased government
expenditure, supporting the notion that economic growth, even through diversification
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efforts, is dependent, either directly or indirectly, on oil revenues,

Private businesses.

which depend on government or private investment, are partly protected from
international competition by 20-percent Saudi tariffs, and they come to rely on these
protectionist measures to survive. When oil revenues started their decline in the 1980s
and persisted into the 1990s, government expenditures, especially in spawning economic
diversification, leveled off, as did their corresponding impact on private sector
involvement. Since 1984, the relative share of non-oil GDP has fallen from 75.8 percent
of overall real GDP to 67.4 percent in 1990. This fall in non-oil GDP share resulted from
a fall in government subsidies to the private sector and an increase in crude oil
97

production, natural gas production, and higher refinery output,

The construction and

service industries noted the biggest falls in their GDP shares, from 14.3 percent in 1984
to 9.0 percent in 1990 and from 66.8 percent to 62.4 percent, respectively.

International Monetary Fund (2006).
Wilson 2002: 16.
The Library of Congre.ss notes that measuring the changing structure of the economy has been difficult because ot the lack of
consistent data on the GDP structure, so statistics must therefore be understood in proper context. After the 1986 price crash and the
shift from the use of the hip a calendar as the basis for government fiscal year accounting, national accounts data were revised and
were generally not comparable to pre-1984 data. Moreover, the base year used was extremely important: if the base year were 1980.
when oil prices were at peak levels, the non-oil sector in 1986 accounted fro 50 percent of real GDP; if the 1970 base year were used,
non-oil CiDP was closer to 75 percent of total output.
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It has also been argued that oil profitability creates a “psychological condition” in
98

the individual that has profound consequences on the labor force and productivity.
Through the dispersal of oil revenues by the central government, many contracts are
awarded as an expression of gratitude, social status, and kinship rather than Western
economic rationale, commonly thought to reward the most productive and efficient
individual actors in an economy. This economic behavior by the Royal Family has a
dramatic impact on the Saudi labor force. Many of the brightest Saudi citizens abandon
the idea of starting new businesses in the hopes of winning lucrative government
projects; the best university graduates become civil servants to take advantage of the only
stable source of income in the Saudi economy - government revenues. That leaves
foreign workers to run the private sectors of the Saudi economy, creating a dependency
that has increased as the number of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia has risen from 3.52
million in 1985 to over six million today. For every one Saudi in the private workforce,
there are four expatriates.^*^ Ordinary Saudis, meanwhile, suffer from an unemployment
rate around 30 percent compared to the 0.8 percent unemployment rate for expatriates.
Annual labor productivity among domestic Saudis, likewise, has faired poorly, falling by
0.1 percent per year from 1990 to 1999 compared to positive rates of 5.5 percent, 2.1
percent, 1.2 percent, and 0.7 percent in East Asia, the United States, Europe, and Latin
100

America, respectively, during that same time period.
Finally, oil revenues entrenched state rule over economic policy-making and
created a dependent culture and workforce. The Royal Family, which had been fractured
by tribal disunity in the 1930s, was consolidated into a cohesive hierarchical group united
101

“by real economic interests rather than vague genealogical and blood links” by 1975.
This power of patronage allowed generosity “to surpass the regular feast of lamb and rice
and the occasional gifts of cloth, dates, and weapons”; instead, the Royal Family grew to
be an elite ruling class that ftinneled oil wealth to its constituents, becoming the
gatekeeper that mediated the existence of all citizens.

,102

Ordinary citizens benefited

from commissions, extra hidden payments that accompanied all development projects,
and the construction boom. The state paid its citizens directly and became the country’s
Yates 1996: 22.
Kevin Taeeker,"Myths and Realities about Unemployment in Saudi Arabia," Saudi-Anierican Forum (2003); 10; figures according
to
the Library of Congress(1991)and British Broadcasting Corporation (2006).
IKI .
Taeeker2003: 11
' Al-Ra.sheed 2002 126.
'Al-Rasheed 2002: 126.
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largest employer. By 1980, the government had nationalized the country’s two largest
companies: ARAMCO and SABIC (Saudi Basic Industries Corporation), as well as the
Saudi Telecom Company, National Company for Cooperative Insurance, and the banking
sector. Additionally, princes who were excluded from the state political machinery or had
no political ambitions found an economic niche with great material rewards. The Royal
Family became accountable to no one, as old taxpayers now escaped the burden ofad hoc
taxation and the first wave of the middle-class- bureaucrats, technocrats, professionals,
and merchants - had no bargaining power against the redistributive power of the state.
The bottom strata of society, meanwhile, became indirectly dependent on oil revenues
through free social services while suffering from high inflation and high levels of
unemployment.
Despite their undermining nature, oil revenues did have positive effects on the
country. Prior to the 1970s, although the Kingdom was politically unified, “economic
103

transactions between the regions and the cities were limited,

However, the creation of

a technologically sophisticated infrastructure that linked cities, towns, and markets by
1990 changed all that. The Saudi economy grew into the largest in the Arab world,
nearly twice the size as those of Israel or Egypt. The country’s 374,000 university
students were second only to Egypt, and the country maintained high levels of literacy
and health care, far above the Arab average. A wide range of successful industries
catered to the domestic market and tlie wider GCC market, from food processing to
104

pharmaceutical products to constmction supplies.

The major achievement of the oil

era was the creation of a national economy for goods, services, and capital, and to a
«105

much lesser extent labour.

Struggling to Find Sustainable Growth
"Perhaps one ofthe more crucial problems that needs to be studied is why the oil exporting countries, in
spite ofthe extraordinary resources that are available to them, have not been among thefastest growing
countries in the world. ”
!06
-British economist Hussein Mahdavy in 1970

In the early twentieth century, Saudi Arabia exemplified the traditional economy
that modernization theorists discussed as the origins of development. The Kingdom, not
yet officially unified, consisted of a populace that was still largely nomadic, traded only

los

Wilson 2004: 3.
thuJ: 2.
thut: 2.
Quoled in Douglas A Yates. The Rentier State in Afrieo, Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press(1996): 15.
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at the local level, and had no organized industry of any kind. This traditional society
constituted an economy that was static, possessed little differentiation or specialization.
107

and had no mechanical division of labor, since none was needed.

The people had no

central means of communication, so their lives played out, almost exclusively, on the
local level. Society had no continual drive toward progress and, above all else, was
^^108

“bound by its inherited cultural horizons,

It was not that Saudi society lacked

inventiveness and innovation, but, as did other traditional societies, it did lack “a
systematic understanding of its physical environment capable of making invention a more
or less regular current flow, rather than a stock ofad hoc achievements inherited from the
„109

past.

Consequently, agricultural farmers, or in Saudi Arabia’s case nomadic

herdsmen, absorbed much of the workforce, and any high proportion of income above
minimum consumption levels was spent on low productivity outlays, like religion and
wars.
Typical trends of Western development, as noted in the modernization concept,
include the preconditions for industrialization, industrialization, consumerism, and post
consumerism. Using Western development as a model for how sustainable development
could occur in non-Westem countries, the modernization concept notes the stages of
socioeconomic change that culminate in an economy capable of sustaining itself. It
should be stated here that the modernization concept is not meant to serve as a roadmap
for non-Westem countries to become more Western, but it is useful in stressing how this
Western path of development created a society and economy that were able to adapt to
gradual, stable change. And so this path is emphasized here, not to allude to which stage
Saudi Arabia is in at the present, but to contrast the path of Western development with
the path that Saudi Arabia took from the 1960s to the present.
The first stage of this growth notes the radical changes in tliree non-industrial
sectors that typically occur before industrialization:(1)the buildup of social overhead
capital, especially in the realm of transportation, that allow the government to effectively
foster trade;(2)a technological revolution in agriculture that allowed fewer workers to
have more overall output, thus resulting in a massive migration to urban areas to find
work in cities; and (3) an increase in foreign trade, especially imports, that facilitate
Alexander Ciersehenkron. Economic liackwanlness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, Massaehusetts: Belknap Press (l'●)62>,
42.
Rostow
Ihiil 1.

7
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market expansion and new raw material inputs needed for industrialization to occur. The
second stage is industrialization itself, which is contrasted with earlier industrial surges in
that the application of modem industrial techniques are “self-sustained rather than
abortive.’

10

This sustained growth occurs because the sources of capital are

institutionalized in such a way that the economy can suffer structural shocks and capital
can be reallocated to other investment resources that resume economic growth. As
industrialization is taken to its logical conclusion, the work force becomes differentiated
and specialized, productivity levels skyrocket, and within the urban population the
proportion of semi-skilled and white-collar workers increases. The third stage is that of
consumerism, when society turns the attention of its mature economy to providing
increased social welfare through the state, to enlarging private consumption on a mass
basis, and to seeking enlargement or maintenance of that nation’s power on the
international stage. The final stage integrates the transformational economic changes
within society, noting how increased consumerism and social welfare results in declining
birth rates, reduced dependency ratios, and other social changes.
Saudi Arabia, however, has taken a markedly different path of development. With
a predominantly traditional society and economy at the country’s founding in 1932,
Abdul Aziz foresaw “the country’s only hope as modernization,” but Saudi Arabia had
in

neither the capital nor the impetus for change,

The discovery of oil, however, changed

all that. With money now at their fingertips, Saudi leaders had both the capital and
successful Western examples to bring their people, literally, out of the desert and into
modem economic wealth through massive development projects. The transition, they
hoped, would be smooth and seamless. So the leaders spent money - huge sums of
money - to transform their nation into a modem nation-state that put one of the most
technologically advanced and well funded infrastmetures in the world at society’s
disposal. Continued projects in the 1980s envisioned a modem economy that perhaps
would have made even Rostow proud: a very high level of differentiation, a high degree
of division of labor, urbanization, literacy, and, above all, an economy that could sustain
itself. Saudi leaders hoped for a level of occupational skill and ratio of capital to labor
that would encourage increased specialization and efficiency. Simply put, they hoped and enacted certain policies - that fostered the development of a modem economy.
I i(t

IhiJ: 7.
Al-Rashecd 2002: 125.
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Unfortunately, the transition was not as quick, nor as smooth, as the Royal Family
envisioned. The very oil revenues that the government was using to create its modem
economy were actually undermining it. Instead of developing the characteristics of a
modem economy, most notably in terms of self-sustained growtli, Saudi Arabia was
actually developing into a rentier one, a condition where economies are predominantly
occupied with “renting” their natural resources to foreign entities. The four defining
characteristics of rentier economies are that rent situations predominate the economy,the
rent must come from outside the country, only a few are engaged in the generation of
rent, while the majority is involved in its distribution and consumption, and the
112

government must be the principal recipient ofthe external rent in the economy.
For countries that fit this mold, like Saudi Arabia, classical economists describe
how difficult and counterproductive development can be. For oil-rich countries, external
rent liberates the state from the need to extract income from the domestic economy.
allowing the government to embark on large public expenditure programs without
resorting to taxation and without being held accountable for its decisions. The economy,
meanwhile, becomes dependent on rent-based revenues and becomes highly susceptible
to price fluctuations. The countries’ sources of wealth, therefore, illustrate the key
difference between rentier and non-rentier economies; rentier economies spawn
governments that become allocation states, with the state itself as the primary source of
revenue, and non-rentier economies spawn governments that are production states, which
rely on the income from its domestic economy through taxpayers, who become involved
with government decisions since they are the ones supporting them. Consequently,
“unearned” government revenues in Saudi Arabia are not the basis of sustainable growth
because they are the subject of“chance and situation” more than “the result of work” that
113

is likely to be mimicked in the future,

In Saudi Arabia’s case, rentier theory explains

how modernization efforts, designed to create a diversified economy built upon
innovation and hard work, failed because the government used massive development
projects not as the means to an end but as the end in itself. Countries like Saudi Arabia,
therefore, in the most fundamental way represent a break in economic behavior “in that it
1^114

fails to embody the work-reward causation.

lla^em Boblawi. The Rentier State in the Arab World. New York: Croom Helm (1987). 3.
Yates 1996: 21.
Ibid 21
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Chapter Four: Finding Social Identity
Describing Social Change
"The ten years ofthe oil boom were a period in which education levels soared, when a principally
agricultural and nomadic population became rapidly urbanized, when tribal and regional divisions were
muted by a sense ofnationalism, and when traditional values running the gamutfrom religion to the work
ethic came under attack. At the same time, a people who had always prided themselves on their
independence andfreedom from authority became tied to an economic system dependent on the distribution
ofoil revenues by the central government.”
115
-Sandra Mackev in Inside the Desert Kingdom

Beginning with the commercialization of oil in the 1940s, Saudi society has
experienced an influx of Western cultural influences. The Kingdom, having escaped
116

foreign domination throughout its history, was “finally colonized during the oil boom.
Only this colonization did not occur in the form of military conquest or economic
imperialism, it came through Westernization funded by the government’s massive oil
revenues. This cultural infusion, meanwhile, created a great deal of confusion in ordinary
Saudis, who found themselves unable to differentiate the worth between Western material
benefits and their own traditional values. Western superiority in materials, technology,
and economic institutions, it seemed, endowed the West with superior power, and Saudi
efforts to imitate the West instilled in them “Western standards of organization and
117

technical kiiow-how” that only magnified their own weaknesses,
118

imported criteria by which to judge their own impotence,

It was as if the Saudis

The effects of the Saudi

oil boom, therefore, have produced a society of indicative progress and underlying
contrast.
The first major Western cultural influences were felt when SOCAL struck oil in
1938. The company, intent on improving the country’s social infrastructure, established
transportation and communication systems in the oil regions and paid for schools and
hospitals in the more underdeveloped, non-oil regions. Those cultural influences
increased correspondingly with rising oil revenues, and by the 1950s SOCAL had
provided the government funds to create government agencies designed to protect the
rural poor. As oil revenues skyrocketed in the 1960s and 1970s, the Royal Family
committed itself to providing a social infrastructure, based on Western standards, capable
of supporting a modem economy. The two oil shocks gave the government the means to

ir
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provide its citizens with all they could possibly need, and early on they decided to do just
that.
119

Table III
Saudi Arabia’s Social Indicators in 1970 and 1990

Population — Total
Population — Foreign
Education — Adult literacy of indigenous population
Education - School attendance of total population
Health - Infant mortality rate
Urbanization — Population in cities
Demography - Indigenous population under 18
Work Force - Men/Women

1970
6.2 million
NA

1990
14.9 million

5.3 million

8.5 percent
64.1 percent
12.5 percent
69.6 percent
118 per 1,000 35 per 1,000
26 percent
73 percent
NA
59 percent
NA 82/18 percent

Throughout the last three decades, education has been one of the chief
beneficiaries of Saudi development efforts, and beginning in 1970 the government began
to offer free general education - which consisted of kindergarten, six years of primary
school, and three years of intermediate or secondary school - to all Saudi citizens. All
instruction, books, and health services were provided free of charge to Saudi children,
and the government committed $73.9 billion - or roughly twenty percent of its annual
GDP - to education from 1985 to 1995 to more fully develop its citizens’ human
resources. Education has been a primary goal of Saudi leaders since the initial spread of
Islam in the eighteenth century, when the Wahhabi movement encouraged the spread of
Islamic education for all Muslim believers. But because the purpose of basic religious
learning was to know only the contents of the Quran, the ability to read Arabic was not a
priority, and illiteracy permeated all parts ofthe Kingdom. In 1970, three years before
the first oil shock, only 15 percent of men and two percent of women were literate in
120

Saudi Arabia.

But oil revenues gave Saudi leaders the means to educate their people through
free schooling. In 1951, the government initiated its first extensive network of publicly
funded secondary schools; three years later, the Ministry of Education was established;
and, in 1957, the government founded the first university not dedicated exclusively to
religious studies in Riyadh University. Crown Prince Faisal and his wife Iffat began
primary public education for girls in 1960, a year that saw only 22 percent of boys and 2
Figures from UNICEF (2006) ami U S. Department of State (2005).
I ibrary of Congress (2005).
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percent of girls attend primary schools. Within a few years, however, public perceptions
of education changed dramatically, and the general population became very supportive of
secular schooling for both sexes. By 1980, school enrollment, which was not compulsory
anywhere in the Kingdom, had risen to 81 percent of boys and 43 percent of girls. A
mere decade later, enrollment consisted almost equally of girls and boys, and the
education system had more than 14,000 institutions, including seven universities and
eleven teacher-training colleges in addition to schools for vocational and technical
training, special needs, and adult literacy. The system expanded so rapidly from 1988 to
121

1989 that the government established 450 new schools to lodge 400,000 new students.
122

Today, the government accommodates 650,000 new students every year.
Healthcare has also been a major recipient of government funding over the last
thirty years. Health benefits for Saudi citizens, consequently, have risen sharply since the
First Development Plan in 1970. In the wake of the first oil shock, the government,
concerned with financing the construction of healthcare facilities and obtaining the most
modem medical equipment available, gave every Saudi citizen access to unlimited, free
medical care. From 1970 to 1990, the government spent roughly 4.6 percent of its GDP
on health care expenditures, roughly $591 per person per year. That funding has
translated into vastly superior health benefits for Saudi citizens over the last 25 years. In
the early 1980s, infant mortality rates were alarmingly high at 118 deaths per 1,000 live
births. However, increased health coverage over its population reduced that number to
21 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1999. Death rates have similarly declined from 20 per
1,000 in 1965 to 7.6 per 1,000 in 1990. Although the Saudi government does not release
comprehensive health statistics, the World Health Organization estimates in 2006 that
there are 1.7 doctors and 2.3 hospital beds per 1,000 persons, and nearly the entire Saudi
population has access to sanitation, clean water, and affordable essential drugs. The same
could not be said of the predominantly rural. Bedouin population forty years before.
Additionally, cholera, plague, yellow fever, and polio have been eradicated from the
Kingdom, and malaria, which plagued 4.2 percent of the population in 1980, now affects
less than one percent today. Life expectancy, meanwhile, has increased from 47 years in
123

1970 to 72 years in 2004.

' All figures obtained from the Library of Congress(1991).
■ figures from IMF (2006).
'Figures obtained from the I ibrar>' of Congress (1991). UNICEF (2006). and the World Bank (2006).
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The country's population has been equally affected by government efforts to
modernize the economy and society. Because massive development efforts were
concentrated in cities, Saudi society experienced a massive urbanization movement from
1970 to 1990. In the early 1970s, an estimated 26 percent of the population lived in
urban centers; in 1990, that figure had risen to 73 percent. The capital Riyadh grew from
666,000 in the 1974 census to roughly 1.8 million ten years later, and the urban
population grew 7.6 percent per year from 1970 to 1990. This movement allowed for the
rapid expansion of education and health care to nearly all Saudi citizens, now that they
were mobilized into easily accessible central areas. The population as a whole,
meanwhile, continued to grow. The total population, an official 6.2 million in 1970,
exploded to 9.4 million in 1980, 14.1 million in 1990, and 20.8 million in 2000. The
population growth rate from 1970 to 1990 stood at a robust 5.2 percent, and the total
124

fertility rate stood at 6.34 children bom per woman in 1990.
Any analysis of Saudi social changes would not be complete without discussing
the role Wahhabi Islam has played in helping Saudis define their Arab identity. This
religious movement, which began in central Arabia in the eighteenth century, grew out of
the scholarship and preaching of Muhammed ibn Abd al Wahhab, a scholar of Islamic
jurisprudence who returned to Najd to preach his message ofIslamic reform. Wahhab
became concerned with how the people of Najd engaged in practices he considered
polytheistic and the laxity of professing Muslims in adhering to Islamic law. To ensure
that the community of the faithful “enjoined what was right and forbade what was
wrong, Wahhab empowered moral enforcers known as the mutawwiin, literally meaning
Ml25

“those who volunteer or obey,

Pursuing their duties in Jiddah in 1806, the mutawwiin

were observed to be “constables for the punctuality of prayers ... with an enormous staff
in their hands,[who] were ordered to shout, to scold, and to drag people by the shoulders
126

to force them to take part in public prayers five times a day.

Initially, Wahhab’s

preaching encountered opposition, but his association with the Al Sa’ud clan ensured the
endurance of the movement that, by the 1970s, consolidated domestic resistance to the
government’s modernization efforts.

124
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Figures in this paragraph obtained from Library of Congress(1991)and UNICEF(2006).
Library' of Congress (1991).
/hid

40

Through massive development projects, Saudi leaders radically transformed their
society’s education and health levels and fostered rapid urbanization. As far as its power
stretched, the government, in effect, assumed the Westernized role of a welfare state, and
major social indicators began aligning with Western norms. However, the government,
intent on creating a modem society capable of supporting a self-sustained economy, did
not succeed in re-defming the true Saudi identity in purely secular terms, and the
country’s Islamic traditions began to stand in increasing opposition to the government’s
modernization efforts. How that opposition would take form in the 1980s and 1990s
remained to be seen.

Struggling with Reform
"Some countlies have saerijiced the soul oftheir culture in order to acquire the tools of Western
technology. We want the tools hut not at the price ofannihilating our religion and cultural values.
-Bakr Abd A llah Bakr. Rector ofthe University ofPetroleum and Minerals in Saudi Arabia

Beginning with the huge rise in government expenditures in 1975, the government
anticipated problems related to the development of the economic and social
infrastructures. Massive oil revenues had brought unprecedented wealth to the Kingdom,
but that affluence certainly came at a price. The dilemma facing government leaders
from the very start was how to acquire a Western style economy while maintaining the
values that were central to Saudi Arabia’s Islamic past. The answer proved difficult to
find, as policy-makers underestimated how deeply rooted religious conservatism was to
Saudi identity. This conservatist backlash, as well as the stratifying effects oil revenues
had on Saudi society, characterized the effects government policies had on Saudi
127

citizens.

First, modernization projects, fueled by massive oil revenues, created new social
classes and exacerbated the socioeconomic difference between the urban and rural
populations. Although the Kingdom does not publish official figures on income
inequality, the impact oil revenues have had on the extremes ofthe population can be
observed. During the reign of King Abdul Aziz in the 1930s, there was only a small
degree of wealth and income disparity. Income was so equal, in fact, that “even the
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Royal Family lived fairly frugal lives,

The richest strata of society were the

merchants of the Hejaz, who continued to live modest lives, and position, rather than
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wealth, detemiined social status. The defining characteristic of Saudi society continued
to be Wahhabi Islam, which stressed the significance of spiritual values more than
material goods. Oil revenues, however, changed all that. Political members ofthe Royal
Family became economically united and separated themselves from the rest of society.
Non-political princes and friends of the Royal Family, meanwhile,found their niche in an
economy that rewarded personal relationships, as is the Islamic custom, more than
productive efficiency. The country’s growing populace, however, was not so lucky, and
the government’s inability to create jobs for Saudi citizens created a large class of
economically unemployed who relied on government benefits for day-to-day survival.
This social contrast was starkly characterized in the division between urban and rural
areas; in 1991, Saudi Arabia was described as having “one foot firmly placed among the
most highly developed nations of the world” and tlie “other foot remaining very much in
the Third World.” Free social services did not reach extensively into the Arabian
Peninsula, and approximately one-quarter of the population lived in areas that lacked
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basic electricity, water, and schooling services.
Second, the creation of an oil-dependent economy resulted in a social disaffection
with the existing economic system in the 1980s, when oil prices started their two-decade
decline. During the rapid expansion of the 1970s, employment in the public sector was
virtually assured for Saudi citizens with technical skills and for those with a Western
education. By the end of the decade, however, those positions, especially in education
and in the ministries, came under pressure from increasing numbers of university
graduates with rising expectations that no longer could be fulfilled in public sector
employment. Unemployment figures rose to alarming levels, as the country’s burgeoning
economy could not create Jobs for its rapidly growing population. In addition, in the
1990s, a growing number of young men educated in Islamic colleges and universities
were unemployed; their acquired knowledge and skills were becoming more irrelevant to
the demands of the economy and bureaucratic infrastructure, even within the judiciary
where traditionally Islamic scholarship was most highly valued. By 2000, Saudi
unemployment was estimated to be 25 percent of the eligible population and a robust 60
percent of Saudi males between the ages of 18 and 24.

Library of Congress(1991).
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Third, efforts at modernization resulted in a rise of cultural conservatism. In
Saudi Arabia, the 1960s and 1970s had been years of explosive development, liberal
experimentation, and openness to the West. Until 1979, government efforts to modernize
Saudi society went unchecked, but the Grand Mosque attack in Mecca and the Iranian
Revolution shocked the Saudi population and reminded the government ofthe sobering
consequences modernization could have on traditional society. Although the mosque
siege was carried out by a small band of zealots whose violent actions inside the mosque
appalled most Muslims, their call for less ostentation on the part of Saudi rulers and a halt
to the West’s cultural inundation of the Kingdom struck a deep chord of sympathy across
the country. At the same time, the call to overthrow the A1 Sa’ud by the new Iranian
leader. Ayatollah Khomeini, was a direct challenge to the Royal Family’s legitimacy

as

custodian of Islam’s two holy places.
As the effects of the government’s modernization efforts hit mainstream society,
the forces of change and conservatism became increasingly evident. Secular education,
population mobility, the breakup of extended family households, and the employment of
women chipped away at the cherished institutions of family and society, and religion
became a refuge and source of stability. Massive urbanization and the altered economic
situation fueled new social groups - students, technical experts, educated young women,
and a vast corps of foreign workers - that favored economic modernization, while other
groups found themselves rooted in religion-based conservatism that only strengthened as
modernizers called for a quicker pace of economic change. In the 1980s, the
conservative revival became apparent in literature, government policies, official and
unofficial relations with foreigners, mosque sermons, protest demonstrations, and
censored television and radio programming.'^® Reacting to the revivalist mood to
institutionalize Islamic laws and social principles, government officials responded by
empowering the mutannviin - through increased state funding - to control social behavior
perceived as non-Islamic. Religiously sanctioned behavior, once thought to be the
responsibility of families, was being increasingly enforced by government institutions.
The mutawwiin, at first primarily responsible for enforcing men to attend prayer times,
began to publicly enforce the abstinence of eating, drinking, and smoking among both
Muslims and non-Muslims. Men and women faced increased pressure to dress in modest

Library of C ongress (1991).

43

clothing that covered their arms and legs; neither could men give women a ride home in
cars unless the two were related.
As Saudi leaders liberally embraced modernization efforts, Islamic clerics incited
ordinary Saudis to more adamantly oppose Westernization. Saudi modernization efforts,
it seemed, had reached a social bridgehead. According to one prominent Wahhabi
scholar, modernization had succeeded only in “disrupting family life, making women
restless in their traditional roles, corrupting the devout, and subjecting the society to the
,,131

disdain of a large Western work force,

It was thus the job of the mutawwiin to

preserve the true Islamic culture while it was still salvageable. Examples ofIslamic
rules’ enforcement are shocking to most Westerners. Women, who were able to travel or
study abroad with ease until 1982, now found tliemselves unable unless their father,
husband, or brother accompanied them. In November 1990, a group of47 educated
women staged a demonstration to press their claim for the right to drive; the government
responded by confiscating the women’s passports, and those who were employed as
teachers were fired. Likewise in 1991, when a Saudi citizen gave a foreign female
coworker a ride home and was sentenced by government courts to a public flogging; his
female coworker was subsequently deported. Non-Muslim religious services, even those
exclusively attended by foreigners, became subject to repressive measures by the
mutawwiin, who broke up a 1991 Christian church service in Riyadh and arrested a
number of participants, including foreign children. Saudis, it was becoming increasingly
apparent, had reconciled their material wealth with a conservative Islamic society that
opposed any sort of Western cultural influence.
A Society in Transition
“Saudi education ceased to be training in the Quran. Instead, the scientific approach to problem solving, a
concept absent in Arab culture, became the method by which Saudis were taught. Thefurther a Saudi went
in the educational proce.ss. thefurther he became separatedfrom those Saudis who dealt with the
Westerners only in the marketplace. And the more an educated Saudi came to live with Western culture,
the more acute his sense ofinternal division became. The well-to-do spent months each year in London or
on the Riviera and then returned to resume life under the dictates ofSaudi culture. The middle class went
West to earn degrees in technological subjects created by the West and then returned to manage Saudi
Arabia 's Western-built infrastmeture with Western-style management techniques that are inappropriate to
Saudi culture. The marginal Saudi was irresistibly attracted to Western culture while at the same time
fearing and despising it. ”
-Journalist Sandra Mackey in Inside the Desert Kingdom

The result, at least for the Saudi people in 2006, is a society of contrasts. After
decades of intense modernization, the country’s urban infrastructure is highly developed
Mackey 2002: 396.
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and technologically sophisticated. Excellent hospitals, clinics, schools, colleges, and
universities offer free health care and education to all Saudi citizens. Shopping malls
have the latest Parisian fashions; supermarkets sell vegetables flown in from The
«132

Netherlands; and amusement parks “are so numerous they dot the urban landscape.
However, modernization has ironically turned Saudi society “upside-down,leaving a
people deeply committed to their traditions awash in a culture they no longer
,.133

understand.

As a result of the effects of modernization, Saudi men have acquired the

characteristics of a ‘marginal’ man “because emotionally he is unable to identify with
either of the two cultures that surround him”- one culture which has been instituted
through forced government projects designed to mimic the West, and the other from the
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deep-seated religious conservatism that has characterized Saudi society for centunes.
But this was not always the case.
In the early twentieth century, Saudi Arabia embodied Rostow’s “traditional
society.” The country consisted of Bedouins who were separated into tribes and
predominately nomadic, rural, illiterate, and hierarchical. Additionally, they were
culturally homogenous and deeply religious, maintained a high population growth rate,
and, based on present Western standards, subjugated the role of women in society. The
only institutionalized schooling that existed in Saudi society at the turn ofthe century was
Islamic education in the Quran. Healthcare consisted of local practitioners treating
common problems with a variety of techniques: exorcism for mental illness, herbal
remedies for physical ailments, and cauterization of wounds with a red-hot nail for
135

coughs, abscesses, and convulsions,

The culture’s values resided in the tribal-family

unit and were largely based on the Islamic religion as expressed through the local
preacher, or imam.
Economic growth, however, offered Saudi leaders the opportunity to transform
Saudi society to the indicative standards of their Western counterparts. Western trends
suggested that the country would experience a series of social changes stemming from
the country’s economic transformation. Technical developments in the preconditions for
industrialization stage would result in (1)a willingness to allow the national government
to extend its authority to effectively moderate trade policy and build up social capital,(2)
1 ibrary t>f Congress (2005).
“ Mackey 2002: 396
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the possibility of widened markets, and (3)the prospect of longer lives for themselves
and their children, new ranges of consumption, new devices of productivity, and higher
levels of welfare. Society would further change during industrialization, when those who
would modernize the economy achieved irreversible transformations over “those who
,136

would cling to traditional society or seek other goals,

These transformations typically

entail a massive urbanization movement, drastic rises in average education levels, and
dramatically-improved healthcare. The consumerism stage would increase the proportion
of semi-skilled and white-collar workers and raise real income per head on a mass basis.
leading to a declining birth rate as families no longer needed to be large to survive and an
expansion of the population would result in the lateral extension of society’s resources.
In the post-consumerism stage, the pursuit offood, shelter, clothing, and durable
consumer goods would no longer dominate people’s lives. In addition, the individual
would feel more relation to the state than he or she did with his or her locality, and
traditional values would be supplanted, or at the very least accommodated, by modem
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ones that stressed knowledge and tolerance.

However, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Saudi Arabia did not experience this
series of social changes, largely because the country’s source of wealth did not foster
economic transfonnation. Instead of empowering the individual through the personal
accumulation of wealth based on work-reward causalities, modernization efforts in Saudi
Arabia were centralized from the very beginning through massive government projects.
Individuals in society were not forced to redefine their values as their Western
counterparts did; instead, Saudi citizens continued their way of life while their leaders
used oil revenues to improve the country’s social inffastmcture while also preserving
society’s traditional Islamic heritage. Consequently, oil revenues benefited society
through improved education and healthcare, but society itself did not change, instead
bypassing the modernization concept’s stages of social progression since individuals
were not being empowered through the country’s economic transformation. Therefore,
the Saudi tale of modernization must be understood as such; instead of a bottom-up, 150year progression through steady economic transformation that has the individual as its
most basic unit, Saudi society has seen its changes come over the last 40 years as a result
of forced government projects implemented from the top-down.
Roslow 1959: 7.
‘ (icrsclienkron 1962:42.
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Accordingly, Saudi society has changed insofar as the government can wield its
‘modernization' power. The levels of urbanization, institutionalized education, and
government-sponsored healthcare have reached distinguishable levels, but- and the
question must be asked - do these indicators demonstrate a true change in Saudi society?
Birth rates have remained alarmingly high, averaging 5.2 percent from 1970 to 1990, and
the Saudi people, rather than benefiting from rising levels of real GDP per capita, have
138

suffered from the reverse.

Likewise, unemployment rates have only increased during

Saudi efforts to modernize. The value system of the society as a whole remains steeped
in religion, as evidenced by the rise of cultural conservatism and the incorporation of the
mutawiin and shari'ah law into the government’s political structures, rather than in
knowledge as are other Western societies. Not surprisingly, the Arab world is lagging
behind in the global digital revolution, with only 11.7 million Internet users out of a total
population of 3 16 million, a 3.7 percent penetration rate, compared to the Group of Eight
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leading industrial nations’ combined 429 million Internet users.

The proliferation of

television sets and mobile phones in the Arab world are also well below the world
average, ahead of only sub-Saharan Africa. Saudi society seems to be in transition,
resenting their ‘backward status,’ according to Western social indicators, yet relishing the
barriers that keep them there. It can no longer be thought of as a purely traditional
society, but neither can it be considered modem.
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Chapter Five: Battling Political Complacency
The Extent of Royal Family Rule
“The political system ofSaudi Arabia is based on the Islamicfaith, which lays down la\vs, constitutions,
and re^tdations. Islam y^uarantees the exercise ofdemocracy: it disapproves ofinertia and imitation. We
believe neither in socialism, nor in communism, nor in any doctrine outside ofIslam; we believe only in
Islam. Some people consider the Western democratic regime as an example to befollowed, a system which
destiny leads all people to accept. We would have acknowledged this willingly when Western democratic
systems were flourishing, but after their scandalousfailure to deal with the problems ofthe individual as
well as their own politicalfailures, we could not consider these systems as the only way to guarantee the
..ijti
general welfare.
-Deputy'Prime Minister Prince Fahd in a November 1974 issue ofhe Monde

Saudi Arabia is deemed Islam’s holiest land after the Prophet Muhammed’s
religious ascendancy occurred at the Mosques in Mecca and Medina in western Saudi
Arabia. Politics and religion in Arab states, consequently, have been closely associated
since the Prophet Muhammed and his political successor Abu Bakr became the first to
unify Arabia in the seventh century. It is no surprise then that Saudi Arabia has followed
this theocratic role of the state. Beginning in the eighteenth century, tlie A1 Sa’ud’s claim
to political legitimacy was directly tied to protecting and adhering to Islamic customs.
The emergence of the “original religio-political movement,” as many Saudi scholars have
termed the A1 Sa’ud and Wahhabi coalition, allowed Abdul Aziz the support he needed to
assert his dominance over the Arabian Peninsula in the twentieth century. The implicit
social contract that the A1 Sa’ud accepted upon the family’s rise to power was the duty to
preserve Wahhabi culture and protect Islam’s two holiest places, the Mosques at Mecca
and Medina. The King’s official title - the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosquesrecognizes his true purpose for governance. Likewise, according to Articles 33 and 34 of
the 1992 Basic Law of Governance, the state has the responsibility to “build and equip
the Saudi armed forces to defend the Islamic faith, the Two Holy Mosques, the society,
and the homeland,” while “defending the Islamic faith, the society, and the homeland
shall [also] be the duty of each and every citizen.

,■>141

Both the Royal Family and Saudi

society have dismissed the notion that separation should exist between church and state,
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laying the foundations for a theocratic state that exists “with a mandate from heaven.
Any explanation, therefore, of Saudi government in purely secular terms would not
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properly attribute the Royal Family’s claim to political legitimacy, nor would it recogmze
religion's penneating influence on government institutions, even in their most basic
functions.
In dealing with the country’s basic structure of government, the Saudi Arabian
King exercises very broad powers and is one of the world’s last absolute monarchs. The
King is both head of state and head of government, and his power extends into the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of governance. Executively, the King is both
the prime minister and the commander-in-chief of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces;
accordingly, he appoints all cabinet ministers, senior government officials, regional
governors, and ambassadors and, as head of the military, has supreme control of Saudi
Arabia’s anned forces and appoints all military offices above the rank of lieutenant
colonel in order to limit the possibility of a coup d’etat. All government legislation is
enacted either by royal or ministerial decree, both of which must be sanctioned by the
King. In addition, the King acts as the final court ofjudicial appeal and has the power to
pardon his subjects. To maintain contact with the Saudi people, the King regularly holds
majlis, meetings designed to provide ordinary Saudi citizens with an opportunity to make
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personal appeals for redress of grievances or assistance in private matters,

Only direct

descendants of the country’s founder Abdul Aziz are eligible to become King, and the
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line of succession beyond the First and Second Deputy Prime Minister is unclear.
In the legislative branch, the King is assisted by the Council of Ministers, a
legislative body founded in 1953 that serves as the principal executive organ ofthe
government. The Council of Ministers has authority to issue ministerial decrees, but it
has no power separate from the King, who must approve all the Council’s decisions. It
consists of the King, the Crown Prince, three royal advisers who hold official positions as
ministers, five other ministers of state, and the heads ofthe twenty government
ministries. Additionally, the governors of Saudi Arabia’s four most important regions Mecca, Medina, Riyadh, and the Eastern Province - as well as the governors of the Saudi
Arabian Monetary Agency and General Petroleum and Mineral Organization serve on the
Council’s board. To consolidate Royal Family political control, the government
expanded its social powers beginning in the 1970s in order to employ the country’s
educated - and potentially most dangerous - populace. Accordingly, the number of civil
Royal r.mbassy of'Saudi Arabia. Washington, D.C, Available at <www.saudiembassy.net>.
"r Latnomic Impact from Saudi Arabia's Succession.” American Middle Hast Info, Available at <www.ameinfo.com''
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service employees in Saudi Arabia increased dramatically to over 400,000 persons by
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1992, all of which are trained at the Institute of Public Administration in Riyadh.
The judicial system is based on the shad ’ah, a moral code of conduct based on
the Quran. Shari'ah law is divided into two main sections governing acts of worship and
human interactions; whatever is deemed non-Muslim is also illegal. Shari’ah applies to
judicial matters in emphasizing that the testimony of women should not be given equal
weight as the testimony of men, and the judge has the right to throw out the testimony of
non-Muslims. In 1928, King Abdul Aziz decreed tlie organization ofthe court system
and the procedures to be followed. Subsequent decrees in 1936 and 1952 for the Civil
Procedures Rules, and in 1955 for the establishment of the Board of Grievances enabled
the judicial system to better deal with the country’s needs as it continued to develop.
King Faisal established the Ministry of Justice in 1970 in order to unify the Kingdom s
vast system of courts and judges, and five years later he also created the Supreme Judicial
Council, which assumed the task of overseeing the court system and approving all death,
amputation, and stoning sentences. These forms of punishment have decreased, as of
2006, but they remain a part of Saudi Arabia’s legal code. The King may grant pardons
at his discretion, except to felons convicted of killing another individual, in which case he
must gain the approval of victim’s next of kin. In contrast to its legislative branch, the
judicial branch operates mostly independently of the King, as stipulated in the 1993 Basic
Law of Governance. Members of the Royal Family, however, are exempt from appearing
before the courts, and allies of the family have received preferential treatment from
judges in the past. All courts are mandated to use the Quran and sunna as the basis of
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judgments.

At the local level, the Saudi government was reorganized after a 1993 royal
decree divided the Kingdom into 13 provinces, and tlie next year subdivided those
provinces into 103 govemorates. Before 1993, the King directly ruled over all areas of
the Arabian Peninsula. Each region was placed under the jurisdiction of a governor,
usually a prince or close relative of the Royal Family. Four times ach year, each
governor meets with his provincial council to evaluate the province’s development and
make recommendations to the Council of Ministers regarding the province’s needs. Each

I jhrary of C ongress (1 Wl).
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provincial council is composed of a minimum often private citizens who are experienced
in their respective fields, and their report is submitted to the Ministry ofthe Interior and
147

passed on to the appropriate government ministries and agencies for consideration.

In

October 2003. the King announced that 178 municipal councils would be created to
advise the provincial governors, and that one-half ofthe new municipal council’s
members would be elected through universal male suffrage, with the other half appointed
by the central government. Those elections, the first ever in Saudi Arabia, took place
between February and April 2005 with more than 1,800 candidates competing for 592
seats. The municipal councils are designed to work in concert with tribal and unofficial
local leaders to address regional concerns, and those in the country’s major cities,
including Mecca, Medina, and Jiddah, will carry out the resolutions passed by the
Council of Ministers at the local level. Until 2005, localities often voiced an opinion on
who should represent them on the provincial councils but had little choice but to accept
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the appointments made by the King.
Wahhabi Islam plays a key role in Saudi politics other than merely providing the
Royal Family’s claim to legitimacy. Saudi Arabia is a theocratic Unitarian state, and its
national ideology is based on the strictest school of Sunni Islam. The King’s role fits into
preserving the Islamic faith, and, accordingly, he has to respect the Wahhabi ulama, a
group of religious scholars designed to preserve Islamic traditions in Saudi society. The
ulama is comprised of the country’s highest religious authorities who act as consultants
to the King, but their role as supreme interpreters of Islam - an interpretation that the
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Their
King must adhere to - makes them the “dominant power in Saudi politics,
power is such that, arguing that Western cultural influences did not have a place in
Islamic societies, they forced the King to postpone the introduction of radio and
television into mainstream society and ruled cigarettes to be illegal for a short time in the
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1940s.

The ulama exercise their power through two official channels: their weekly

meetings with the King and their control of the mutawwi’in, and the religious group
rejects reinterpretation of the Quran and sunna in regard to issues clearly settled by early
Islamic jurists, seemingly putting the country’s religion at odds with its increasing
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Western cultural infiltration. However, ample scope for reinterpretation remains for
Wahhabi jurists in areas not decided by the early jurists, as demonstrated in King Fahd’s
repeated calls in the 1990s for scholars to engage in ijtihad-or personal decisions based
on intellect - to deal with new situations confronting Saudi attempts to obtain a modem
1.^1

economy.
The Royal Family, comprised of direct male descendants of Abdul Aziz,
dominate the country's basic structures of governance. The personality and uncontested
authority of Abdul Aziz enabled him to maintain tribal unity and consolidate political
power around his direct descendants. Nevertheless, the tribe persisted as the basis of
power in the country's social and political spheres throughout the 1930s and 1940s. By
the mid-1950s, however, when oil revenues started to increase substantially, the Royal
Family began to dominate the Saudi political scene. In 1970, the main family consisted
of hundreds of sons and grandsons of the country’s founder, and those descendants
occupied all the govcmment's most important posts: first and second deputy prime
minister. Defense and Aviation, Public Works and Housing.'^" The Royal Family still
experiences the same type of influence today. Outside the inner ring of power. Royal
Family nepotism is only amplified; a series of supreme councils, including Education,
National Security, Universities, Oil Affairs, Youth, Pilgrimage, and Industrialization,
fonnerly headed by non-Saud officials is under the direct control of the Royal Family.
Today, the government maintains a strong influence over tlie economic and cultural
spheres of Saudi society. Outside of their burgeoning civil service, the govermnent owns
the country’s largest-employing businesses, including Saudi ARAMCO,SABIC,and the
General Electricity Corporation. In addition, the government subsidizes private sector
development through the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, which provides money for
aspiring entrepreneurs. The 1993 passage of the Basic Law of Government, which
outlined the powers and purpose of each branch of government, gave the central
government broad powers over society as well. The media’s role, according to the King,
is to educate and inspire national unity, with the result that most popular grievances go
unreported. Newspapers are privately owned but subsidized and regulated by the
government. Although self-censorship continues to be a method of self-preservation for
the nation’s print media outlets, government censorship has decreased since 1980,
''' Bliyh 19S5: 40.
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especially on journalistic inquires into crime and terrorism. The government owns and
operates the radio and television companies in Saudi Arabia. Censors remove
objectionable material deemed offensive by Islamic standards. Legal access to the
Internet must be \ ia local ser\ ers, which the government monitors to prevent its citizens
from accessing pornography, politically offensive material, or anti-Islamic websites.
Despite these controls, Saudi Internet users have been able to access most sites they wish
153

to visit by simply connecting through alternative servers.

Battling ‘Well-Oiled’ Complacency and Internal Tensions
“The short-livetl oil embargo led to dramatic increases in oil prices, allowing Saudi Arabia to enjoy an
unprecedented affluence, which . . . strengthened the ability^ ofthe regime to extend services, enforced state
control over the population, and created dependency on its own resources.... During the affluence ofthe
1970s and the austerity ofthe l9S0s. one theme.seemed dominant in Saudi politics: a deep-rooted
vulnerability, itselfa product ofdemographic/economicfactors, developmentfactors, and the
responsibilities ofgeography that made the Saudi regime the guardian ofthe two holy mosques."
154
-Madawi al-Rasheed

Beginning with the huge rise in government expenditures in the early 1950s, from
$13.5 million in 1946 to $212 million in 1952, the state took on an increasing role in the
social and economic lives of its citizens. The creation of seven new ministries- Foreign
Affairs, Finance, Interior, Health, Communication, Agriculture, and Education - by 1955
signaled that the Saudi government was expanding its domestic and international role.
Further increases in oil prices led to corresponding increases in government revenues,
and by 1970 the number of Saudi ministries had increased to fifteen. Oil revenues, it was
becoming increasingly apparent, were having their effects on the Saudi political structure.
But the very nature of that oil wealth transformed Saudi Arabia into an allocation state,
which succeeded in entrenching Royal Family rule, expanding the central government’s
power, and exacerbating social and religious tensions that only served to constrain
leaders’ future modernization efforts.
First, oil revenues entrenched state rule over the population by creating a new
socioeconomic ruling class in the Royal Family. Dating back to the A1 Sa’ud’s rise to
power in the eighteenth century, there were no major distinctions between social classes.
Privileged classes, even in the days of the country’s modem founder Abdul Aziz, had
been unknown. The first palace of Abdul Aziz was constmeted of sun-dried mud bricks,
the same material that peasants used. Shayklis - tribal leaders in society - and bedouin
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herdsmen - commoners which formed the pillar of the Saudi populace - called each other
155

by their first names, and the clothing of both the rich and poor was quite similar.
Beginning in the 1950s, however, oil revenues created a stark class distinction between
those in power and those who were not. Sons and grandsons of Abdul Aziz began using
oil revenues to build lavish palaces for themselves. Currently, the King alone has 38
palaces throughout the Arabian Peninsula, the smallest of which is over a million square
15(1

feet.

Citizens were becoming more and more aware of the dual culture emerging in the
country. Dissatisfied with the low wages ofthe growing labor force, Saudi citizens began
relying on the government for the development of public works projects, educational
institutions,job creation, and direct subsidies. The Royal Family, meanwhile, exclusively
wielded the distributive power of the country’s oil wealth, deciding with whom to do
business and making the country’s business elite and middle class dependent on A1 Sa’ud
consent, the fonner because they relied on huge government contracts and the latter
because they were technocrats or civil servants employed in nationalized sectors ofthe
economy. Members of the Royal Family used ‘the carrot and stick’ to gather support,
rewarding loyalty with bureaucratic jobs or government contracts and punishing
dissidence with economic excommunication and direct violence. In this manner, oil
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revenues helped to build the Royal Family into an elite ruling class.
Second, oil revenues undennined government attempts at economic and social
modernization by over-consolidating the central government’s power exclusively in the
hands of the Royal Family. Due to increased pomp and luxury, the Royal Family, which
had succeeded in unifying the Arabian peninsula only four decades before, was now
becoming a polarizing factor in Saudi society. The family, therefore, came under
increasing domestic criticism that only grew more poignant with time. By the 1960s, the
social clamor over the lack of development projects forced the government into action,
but the Royal Family -marked by its “well-oiled complacency”- proved reluctant to
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willingly abdicate power, even to its own citizens.
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regimes, oil wealth ironically becomes a barrier to good governance and development
,159

even as it provides the material wealth capable offunding development projects.
Rather than embracing reformers’ calls for government accountability, which
came mainly from liberal princes and the sons ofthe rising middle class educated abroad,
the government attempted to discourage the formation of critical attitudes and rewarded
its supporters without addressing any of its opponents’ fundamental concerns. College
students abroad were forbidden to major in law, political science, or related areas.
Government workers were forbidden to strike or criticize the government under the
penalty of dismissal. Meanwhile, Kings Faisal and Khalid clarified the Saudi
government’s responsibilities to provide its citizens with suitable economic opportunities
and free education, healthcare, and unemployment benefits while maintaining the
country’s role in preserving Islamic culture. The emergence of a group of middle-class
professionals in the 1960s and 1970s - a group that generally resented the lack of
opportunities for the average Saudi and sought popular sovereignty as a means of
ensuring socioeconomic development- threatened the absolute monarchy’s stability.
Beginning in the 1960s, many of the Saudi middle-class professionals tried to pressure
the monarchy into creating an elective representative assembly, but the Royal Family
resisted demands for political liberalization by strengthening its ties with the ulama^
which tended to distrust the notion of popular government because of the implicit
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assumption that manmade legislation could be equal to sacred law.
Finally, the domestic convergence of political power exacerbated social tensions,
especially for religious conservatives, and seriously undermined the country’s ability to
modernize its social and economic infrastructure. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the
theme that permeates Saudi polity is the A1 Sa’ud clinging to power. Despite the Royal
Family’s attempts to curb opposition within its society, criticism persisted from both
extremes in the country’s religious conservatives and liberal modernizers. The physical
manifestation of that criticism in the form of violence with the 1979 Grand Mosque
takeover proved to be a harsh check on the government’s domestic policy-making power,
especially in its approach to modernization. Saudis, already infuriated by the American
alliance with Israel, began to view the permeation of Western culture with distrust.
Notions of the ‘secular West’ and ‘Islamic Saudi Arabia’ became mutually exclusive, and
Clement Henry.“A Cla.sh of Cilobalizations." Ilan ani Inteniational Review 25(2003); 2.
I ibrary of Conyres.^ (1491).
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government efforts at modernization always had to be accompanied by the religious
ulama's full support, which became more and more difficult.
The chasm between Royal Family rule and its support grew further apart with the
1990-91 First Persian Gulf War. Immediately after Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, it
became clear that Saudi Arabia, which had spent 20 percent of its GDP in the 1980s on
161

military defense, could not face Iraqi forces alone.

Within days ofthe Iraqi invasion,

King Fahd requested U.S. protection, and more tlian 540,000 Allied troops from 34
countries entered Islam's holiest land. The social backlash resulting from Fahd’s request
fomented the Royal Family's opposition for nearly a decade. Two petitions calling for a
restructuring of the government appeared on King Fahd’s desk within the year, and
religious scholars sparked a debate centered on whether any government that has to resort
to non-Muslims in order to defend itself can be considered a legitimate Islamic
government. Meanwhile, physical violence from dissatisfied Saudi citizens rocked the
social landscape. In 1995, a car bomb killed five Americans and two Indians at the
offices of the Saudi National Guard in Riyadli. A year later, 19 American soldiers were
killed and 372 others were wounded when the Khobar Towers apartment complex was hit
by a large truck bomb. The first attack on Saudi citizens themselves came in May 2003,
when a suicide bombing on the Vinnell Compound in Riyadh killed 35 Saudis and
wounded over 200. Since then, the country has been victim to no fewer than 25 terrorist
attacks, and Saudi-bom Osama bin Laden’s claim foxjihadists to overthrow the Royal
Family has only exacerbated the soociopolitical scene. In this turmoil, efforts at
modernization - and modernization’s association with the West in the minds of ordinary
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Saudis - have been hindered.

By the time it became apparent that the conditions ofthe Saudi society and
economy were unsustainable, real oil prices had begun their two-decade decline. The
government, eager to pacify its critics through oil revenues, found its funds limited, as
evidenced in the country’s two decades of budget deficits from 1983 to 2002. The Royal
Family, however, proved unwilling to surrender power, spuming at least three written
requests each by conservative religious leaders and leading intellectuals calling for
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government accountability to its citizens.
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inhibited and the country facing an impending crisis, Saudi leaders had to act, thus the
passage of the 1992 Basic Law of Governance and the 2005 municipal elections-the
two most important and most democratic political developments in the last three
centuries. By the time those political changes were first enacted in the early 1990s,
however, the country had lost its opportunity for obtaining self-sustained economic
growth, and the Royal Family became consumed with dealing with critics who, left
unchecked, could threaten the family’s own absolute rule.
The Struggle for Reform
“fVe arc' conf'ulcnt that the system, with the grace ofGod, will he beneficial in the achievement ofthe well
being, progress, ami prosperity of the Saudi citizen, his countty and his Islamic and Arab community. The
Saudi citizen is the main pillar ofthe deyelopment and progress ofhis country, and we shall spare no effort
to achieye his hapjyiness and welfare."
164
-King Fahd after the enactment ofthe 1992 Basic Law ofGovernance

Throughout the early part of the twentieth century, Saudi Arabia embodied
Rostow’s traditional government. Tribal leaders controlled rural, isolated territories by
exerting their power over the families under their control. The rise of the A1 Sa’ud clan
in the late nineteenth century resulted in the consolidation of the whole Arabian
Peninsula and the concurrent spread of Wahhabi Islam. Since Islam is such a pervasive
social and political force in Saudi Arabia, the two factions’ inseparable linkage resulted
in the creation of a theocracy in 1932. From the very beginning, the ruling A1 Sa’ud
family acted as an absolute monarchy, with its only check coming from the government s
close association with the ulama, a body of Wahhabi scholars that provided religious
legitimacy for A1 Sa’ud rule. Meanwhile, the King was not constrained by a written
constitution, a legislative assembly, or popular elections. The country had no written
legal justice system; instead, they operated un&Qv shari'ah law. Saudis considered the
Quran, the holy book of Islam, to be their constitution, and they did not require the
government to forge a contract that guaranteed the basic rights of citizens, like the
freedom of belief, expression, assembly, or political participation. Simply put, in the
Saudi political realm in the middle of the twentieth century, the government was ruled by
«I65

a hierarchical elite based on a “mandate of Heaven.

The modernization concept, however, stresses the effects economic growth has on
the political institutions of traditional society. Trends suggest that in the first stage of
development — the preconditions for industrialization - society undergoes a definitive
IM
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political transformation. The government extends its effective role to harness the
national energies, talents, and resources around the concrete tasks ofeconomic growth.
In the industrial stage of development, government typically creates the matrix for
sustained industrial growth by building up social overhead capital, agriculture, and trade.
During this stage, society begins holding their leaders accountable according to secular
standards of success. The consumerism stage results in a rising per-capita GDP and, with
it, a grow ing middle class who becomes more interested in political participation. The
government, now managing production states, relies on taxation ofthe domestic economy
for its income; the taxpayers, meanwhile, stay involved with government decision
making because they are supporting them with onerous taxes. In the post-consumerism
stage, the political institutions become cemented, and the government typically
redistributes excess tax revenues to the rest of society through social services designed to
help the poor.'^’^’
The story of twentieth-century political development in Saudi Arabia is not what
did happen but, conversely, what did iwt happen. Three decades ago, oil revenues
succeeded in entrenching A1 Sa’ud influence over the Arabian Peninsula and
consolidating political control of the country. Since then, the government has proved
unwilling to return that political power, even after numerous petitions to check the Royal
Family’s absolute power had been sent to the central government. In May 1991, more
than 400 men from the religious establishment and universities, including Saudi Arabia’s
most prominent legal scholar Shaykh Abd al Aziz ibn Baz, petitioned the King to create a
Consultative Council that participated in government decision-making. In a follow-up
petition, a number of the signatories wrote letters stating that funds for religious
institutions were being cut back, their passports had been confiscated, and they were
being continually harassed by security personnel even though “they had committed no
«167

other crime that giving advice to the Guardian.
Since the 1980s, Saudi Arabia has stood distinct from the rest ofthe Arab world
in that the government and legal system have never lost their status as purely Islamic in
nature. That is not to say that other Arab states have no role for the Quran,swma,or
shari'ah, all which play dominant roles in state governance in Saudi Arabia. Instead,
those states developed hybrid systems that incorporate Islamic traditions through special
fhtd 4-15
I ibrary <●! ( ongress ( 1W1)

58

constitutions but maintain separate secular codes ofconduct. Traces of this religiopolitical fusion is found in the Saudi political structure, but on the whole the Saudi order
168

is predominantly Islamic-based.

Although all Gulf countries followed the Saudi model

of central planning and state capitalism in the 1970s, most ofthem have been “faster to
abandon it, quicker to diversify away from oil, and nimbler in attracting foreign
investment.

Saudi leaders' reluctance to reform prompted an editorial by The

Economist that stressed how “the cure for oil addiction is known,” but many in the Royal
«170

Family find the political answer “unpalatable.

Nevertheless, low oil revenues forced the Royal Family to make some reforms.
The ruling monarchy announced the adoption of Basic Law in 1992, which declared the
basic form and scope of Saudi government. It stated that Saudi Arabia is a monarchy
ruled by the sons and grandsons of Abdul Aziz, that the Quran is tlie constitution ofthe
counti-y, and that the population is governed on the basis ofshari’ah. It also outlined the
Saudi system of governance, stating that the checks on the King’s powers are that his
decrees must conform to the Quran and the shari’ab, and he must retain a consensus of
the Royal Family and the ulama. In addition to the adoption of Basic Law,the King
issued several decrees in 1992 that outlined the basic statutes of government and codified
for the first time the procedures concerning Royal succession. The creation ofthe
Supreme Judicial Council, composed of 12 senior jurists, and the Consultative Council in
1992, which has only advisory power, also signals increasing hints of popular
representation in the Saudi government. Since Crown Prince Abdullah’s 1998 speech in
which he plainly stated that the oil boom was over, reforms have gathered steam.
Privatization, tariff reductions, municipal elections, increased transparency, and World
Trade induction demonstrate the slow - and I stress the word slow - convergence of the
Saudi system of governance to modernization trends. Yet an enormous amount of work
remains to be done.
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SECTION III

The Future Kingdom
Chapter Six

Upholding the Modernization Concept

After two deauies ofdepressed oil prices, the Saudi Kingdom was in crisis by the late
1990s. Continual budget deficits,falling oil revenues, and a huge decrease in per-capita
GDP caused the country to reach a criticaljuncture in its development. Chapter Six
outlines this crisis, examines Saudi leaders'reforms, and comments on the immediate
prospects offuture development policies. This chapter also offers a contemporary
outlook ofthe Saudi economy, society, and politics, and analyzes how recent reforms
conform to the modernization concept.
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Chapter Six: Upholding the Modernization Concent
The Current Crisis
"The eounny is ill ii criiiailJuncture. It can coast along without radical changesfor only one or two
years, ma.ximum."
- The manager ofa regional investmentfund group in September 2002

A quick glance at book titles on contemporary Saudi Arabia reveals a hodgepodge
of subject matter that suggests the Kingdom has reached a critical juncture in its
development: John Bradley's Saudi Arabia Exposed:Inside a Kingdom in Crisis,
Matthew Simmons's Twilight in the Desert, and Laurent Murawiec’s Prwces of
Darkness: The Saudi Assault on the West. Additionally, recent publications on Saudi
Arabia in some of the West's most prominent magazines portray a country on the verge
of collapse: The Economist \s articles entitled “A Long Walk,” “Adapt or Die,” “The
Suffocating Limits of Refonn,” and “Beyond Oil”; Time’s “Enemy from Within,” “An
American Murdered, a Kingdom under Siege,” and “Wahhabism: Toxic Faith?”;
New.swcck \s “Saudi Stonns,” “The Saudis’ Trap,” and “Like a Virus that Spreads”; The
Harvard International Review’s “A Clash of Civilizations”; and Atlantic Monthly’s “The
Curse of Oil Wealth.” The consensus, at least among those in the press, is that the
country is in desperate need of refomi, and the Kingdom’s lack of sustainable economic
growth, coupled with the “end of the oil era,” as Crown Prince Abdullah noted in a 1998
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speech, has caused the countiy to reach a crisis of development.
Problems related to Saudi development are as easy to identify as they are difficult
to overcome. Economically, the country’s per-capita GDP has declined in real terms
from $18,000 in 1980 to $8,000 in 2004, and Saudi citizens’ standard-of-living has
172

suffered as a result.

The small growth in GDP from 1980 to the present - a yearly

average of 1.5 percent - must now support a population that has averaged 4.2 percent
yearly growth from 1975 to 2003, and economists predict that the Saudi economy must
173

grow at a per annum rate of6 percent to keep unemployment in check,

Only in 2003,

as Figure VI11 illustrates, has the linear regression of real GDP growth exceeded that of
the population growth rate, a shift driven by three consecutive years of real GDP growth,
the first time that has occuned in a quarter-century. Before that shift, the population

''“Beyond Oil." Ttw economist ,Vi2 (March 2002): 17.
' Digby I idslone."A Clear ObjeeJive." h fitUUe East Economic Digest 49(2005): 50.
' ‘ Human Development Reports. "Saudi Arabia: Country Sheet," United Nations Development Programme(2005), Available at
http: dtdr undp-org statistics'data counlries.cfm?c-SAU''.
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grew lasier than the counin 's wealth, meaning that individuals in society were becoming
increasing I \ poorer.
,’174

FIGURE \

I he country’s rapidly growing population has also created new pressures on the
countity’s costly infrastructure. Demand for electricity is expected to rise by 250 percent
over the next 20 years, and for desalinated water by 300 percent. Meanwhile, the
economy is still dependent on oil as the main engine for growth, although oifs share of
the GDP has fallen to 40 percent in 2005 from 85 percent in 1974; this decline is
attributed to the two-decade decline in oil prices, the government's use of oil revenues to
build up non-oil industries like petrochemicals and refinery output, and growth in the
17.*^

countity’s private sector.

If the price of oil drops by one dollar in a given year, the

Saudi government loses approximately S2.5 billion in export revenues. Consequently,
the coLintity’s GDP is dominated by oil. and a breakdown of the GDP structure, as Figure
V shows, demonstrates that the majority of Saudi wealth comes from industry, which
employs only one-quarter of the workforce and generates over half the countiy’s wealth.
Meanwhile, the majority of the workforce is in seiwices, where foreign workers comprise
I7f.

over 90 percent of that sector's labor force.

These figures show that most domestic

Saudis are employed either in industry - three-quarters of which is crude oil production
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or aynculiurc. neither ih'whieli are indicative of post-industrial, diversified economies
tliai rel\ on ser\ lecs for their wealth.
T.\BLE I\ ‘
2005 GDP Structure
(percent value

2005 GDP Structure
(percent workforce)

Agriculture
12%

3

Industry
25%

Services

Oil's effect on the rest of the economy is still strongly felt. “When oil prices fall
it tends to be iin estment expenditure rather than government spending on salaries that is
affected the most. Ironically, it is the investment in diversification and in achieving selfsustaining. non-oil-dependent development that suffers, while what can be classified as
consumption through public sector wages is maintained." This claim is supported by the
behavior of the pri\ ate sector when oil prices reached their lowest level in the past three
decades in the mid-1980s; from 1984 to 1990, oil revenues fell sharply, and the
government limited funds to promote private sector growth. As a result, by 1990, the
private sector had receded at a faster rate of growth than oil revenues, and the relative
share of non-oil GDP fell from 75.8 percent of overall real GDP in 1984 to 67.4 percent
in 1990. demonstrating oil’s adverse affects on the rest of the Saudi economy when prices
are relatively low’. Oil revenues declined to such a degree in the 1980s and 1990s that the
country went from a budget surplus of $28 billion in 1974 to a $176 billion domestic
public debt by 2003. which comprised 95 percent of the country’s GDP. The country’s
foreign reserves, meanwhile, have evaporated to only $22.6 billion from $100 billion in
I7S

1980,

Saudi Arabia's current account balance, the difference in goods and services

that the country has exported rather than imported, stood at negative $181,3 billion from
1983 to 1998, with the only years of positive trade coming in 1996 and 1997, when the
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country a\cragcd a $0.5 billion surplus compared against an average per annum loss of
SI3.0 billion during deficit years.
Socially, in the early 2000s, the country was tom between its entrenched religious
establishment and efforts at refomi. This divide was never more evident than a March
2002 school fire in Mecca, where 800 pupils were attending class when a fire broke out,
and mutau iin were seen beating several girls who attempted to escape while wearing
neither their govemnient-required headscarves nor abayas. The Saudi Gazette reported
that nnitawiiu physically hindered efforts by firemen to rescue the girls, saying that it was
“sinful to approach them,

The fire claimed the life of fifteen girls and injured more

than fifty others, evoking outrage from both domestic and international media outlets.
Response to the tragedy was divided among the country’s radical religious establishment
and its liberal middle-class professionals.
In addition, cinemas are still banned, as is music in public places; companies are
even forbidden from playing music while placing customers on hold. St. Valentine’s Day
is expressly forbidden by authorities, who regard tlie holiday as being “pagan Christian,”
and 200 Bangledeshi and Burmese workers were arrested in 2004 for dancing and
drinking despite the edict. Satellite television is also illegal, although available to an
estimated 80 percent of the population, and the government blocks approximately 30,000
180

Internet sites that it deems not suitable for Muslims.

Demographics is also hindering

prosperity, as an estimated 60 percent of the indigenous population is under the age of20.
Unemployment rates, although no one can agree on a figure, range between 9 and 30
percent, and it is particularly rife among recent university graduates, 50 percent of which
181

are unable to find jobs within a year of graduation,

As Saudis become more educated

and cosmopolitan, many of them, especially professionals, resent the country’s isolation
from the modern world, the power of clerics to control their social life, and the ability of
the Royal Family to limit their influence in public affairs.
These social problems are manifesting themselves into political ones. Although
the Royal Family is still stably in power, terrorism has become an increasing issue.
Fifteen of the 19 hijackers for the September 11 attacks on the United States were Saudi,
1
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and this social phenomenon contributed to the approximately 15,000 Saudis participating
in the Afghanistan ///zt/c/ movement to oppose American occupation beginning in 2002.
Attacks on Saudi Arabia itself began with the 2003 Riyadh bombings, and the
gov'emment carried out 1 58 raids on suspected terrorist elements in 2003 alone.
Nevertheless, ihc /i/nu/ist cause lives on. Osama bin Laden enjoys a semi-celebrity status
among the nation's extreme religious establishment, prompting one Western European
ambassador to quip in 2004,“If there were an election today, bin Laden would win by a
landslide."'^" 1 lis admirers are said to reside mainly on university campuses and among
the rising number of unemployed.
These economic, social, and political problems in Saudi Arabia are made even
more difficult by entrenched obstacles that stand in tlie way of reform. The Royal Family
is unwilling to surrender power, even to its own citizens. However,the country’s
growing middle class, consisting mainly of professionals and government technocrats,
generally resent their lack of participation in public affairs. “The Royal Family is one of
the main obstacles to reform in Saudi Arabia,” Dr. Jean Francois Seznec remarked in a
telephone interview for this paper. “Its members, as a whole, are corrupt and are leeches
on society. They will never giv^e up power as long as they have access to the country’s
183

$25 billion defense budget, which is all open to corruption,

The country’s religious

establishment also stands in the way of progress by opposing any sort of liberal change.
Islamists, as they have become known, have dominated the public’s attention and are, by
far, the most coherent, powerful, and organized social force in Saudi Arabia. The issue
of women, meanwhile, is becoming an increasingly heated debate, as they comprise more
than half of the country’s university students and only an estimated 18 percent of the
184

country’s workforce.

The restraint is clear; for women to enter the workforce in large

numbers necessitates a complete social transfonnation away from the established
religious elite. In discussing these potential reforms, the country’s social divide is clearly
seen; Islamists demand for a return to conservative society following the path of the
Prophet Mohammed, and they are countered only by modernizers, who view the central

“Adapt t>r Die." The Tcotutmist 370(March 2004): 43. The same articles notes of bin Laden’s popularity: “It is, ofcourse,
difficult to judtzc the popularif>' t>f Mr bin 1 adcn--or indeed of anyone in the kingdom, given the absence of elections, the muzzling of
the media, the rehietanee
talk t>penly about polities and the dearth of opinion polls. A survey carried out last July for the ArabAmeriean Institute, an American lobby, found barely 8% of respondents praising the al-Qaeda leader—perhaps unsurprisingly, given
Saudi awareness of the risks of dissent. It seems likely, anyway, that his popularity has dipped since the November attacks."
Dr. Jean Francois Sez-nee ( F’rofess».>r C'olumbia LJniversity). Telephone conversation with author(2 April 2006).
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problem of Saudi Arabia as forging its socioeconomic future, not reconnecting with its
religious past. According to one Western-educated, middle-class Saudi,“The problem
here is not Islam, fhe problem is too many young men with no job and no university
education and now here to go except to the mosque, where some [radical preachers] fill
their heads with anger for America. Every home now has two or three networking. This
-1S5

is the real problem.'

Finding Solutions for Dialectic Development
"Saudi cc ononii.sis. husim.ssni<.n. and even government q/Jicials know quite well what is wrong, and what is
needed to fix it. yet tnt enormous amount of work remains to be done.... The curefor oil addiction is
..ISry
known, hut some find it unpaUitahle.
-The Economist in March 2002

The exact extent of the Saudi crisis is still being debated, but few scholars
disagree that the country is in desperate need of some degree of reform.
4.^

Unambigucnisly, the country is facing a crisis,” Dr. Rachel Bronson of the Council on
4C

Foreign Relations said in a telephone interview for tliis paper, It has been experiencing
a revolution in slow' motion for the last two decades. The optimism tliat many experts
have is that at least Saudi leaders now recognize they have a problem. For decades, you
couldn't even get them to do that, but things have changed now. Having said that, the
country is still experiencing a crisis of development that many countries in the region
»187

have, and if changes don't occur, then it won’t last as we now know it.
Crown Prince Abdullah was the first to advocate reform when he began running
the day-to-day operations of the Kindgom after King Fahd, his older brother, suffered a
debilitating stroke in 1 995. Abdullah, who has commanded the National Guard from
1 962 to the present, has had the main responsibility of ensuring domestic stability for
over forty years, and his complex understanding of the domestic sociopolitical
environment has led him to believe that economic prosperity and self-sustaining growth
are the only preconditions for Saudi stability. However, Abdullah’s first speeches
advocating change — a 1998 speech in which he declared that the oil era had come to an
end, and a 1999 speech in which he emphasized the increasing need to achieve selfsustaining growth through increased international trade - had few actual results. By
1 998, the countiy had a public debt of more than 120 percent of its GDP,and any efforts
to reform were fiscally constrained by the government’s continual budget deficits. “In
l
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1999, Saudi leaders publiely recognized that they had a problem, but they couldn’t do
● I .sS

anything about it.'

1 low e\ er. on the back of record-high oil prices in the early twenty-

first centur>\ the Kingdom recorded three consecutive years of public budget surpluses
for the first lime in its histor>\ Surpluses of$12 billion in 2003,$26.1 billion in 2004,
and S57.1 billion in 2005 have once again handed Saudi leaders the tools for reform.
C hanges ha\ e inundated the country since Abdullah first made public his desire to
create sustainable economic grow th in 1999, and Saudi leaders have increasingly begun
to remove the countiy's underlying barriers to refomi while addressing its impending
social, economic, and political problems. The former Crown Prince has checked the
power of the Royal f amily and the religious establishment in very subtle ways. First, in
1999, he created the Supreme Economic Council, a royal advisory body designed to
foster sustainable de\ elopment, and in 2003 appointed expert civil servants rather than A1
Sa’ud princes to head the Ministries of Commerce and Industry, Finance, and Economy
and Planning. Likew ise, the government no longer employs royal princes at Saudi
ARAIVIC’(3, and SABIC, the wwld's seventh largest company, has only one prince who
serves as a figurehead and exercises no real power. Abdullah has also sought to shift the
country’s public opinion away from religious conservatism and towards economic
prosperity by restraining the miitcnviin through a decrease in government funding and
defining their roles with regards to society. After the 2002 school fire that claimed the
life of 15 Saudi girls, Abdullah responded by moving girls’ education out of the Ministry
of Religion and into the Ministry of Education. “King Abdullah is making an enormous
effort to solve the country’s problems. By limiting the power ofthe Royal Family and
the religious establishment, Abdullah is empowering the civil service to run the country.
They arc the ones behind the country’s enormous industrialization effort, and what’s
happening is they’re developing the country so quickly that they’re marginalizing the
189

religious establishment.
Abdullah has also implemented certain programs to alleviate specific economic,
social, and political problems. The reduction of tariff rates from 20 percent to 5 percent
in most sectors and 15 percent or less in the agricultural sector, the lowering of the
corporate tax rate from 45 percent to 20 percent, and a string of private sector initial
public offerings have injected momentum and liquidity into the Saudi economy. The
ihiii
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implementation c^f the Capital Market Law in July 2004 has created a vastly improved
foreign direct investment regime, and the IMF projected Saudi Arabia to have an influx
of foreign direct in\ estment for the first time in the country’s history in 2005. Offshore
assets of(SO.000 of the country 's high net worth citizens are estimated at $700 billion in
2005, approximately 220 percent of GDP,among the world’s highest capital flight ratios.
However. Abdullah's economic liberalization efforts have created lucrative investment
opportunities in gas exploration and development, tlie mobile phone industry,
communications and technology, power-generation and distribution, insurance,
petrochemicals, and private healthcare insurance. The rapid growth ofthe country’s
securities market prompted the general manager of Saudi Oger, a major private holding
company with diverse interests in Saudi Arabia in telecoms, power, and constmetion, to
say,“The economics make sense, as the oil prices go up and the stock markets in the
West and the US go down. There is a huge potential for investment here. Look at the
Saudi economy and the government plans for privatization of the water utilities,
electricity, and the telecoms sector. In electricity, the government will spend something
between $30 billion and $40 billion over the next seven years. In water utilities, it’s a
similar figure. We have a growing population that needs those services. These areas are
ripe for investment.

1f these areas of the economy could attract a return of Saudi

foreign assets of only 5 percent per year, it could inject tremendous capital inflows into
the securities market that could spark domestic consumption and development to replace
191

oil as the main engine behind economic growth.
To alleviate the growing social problem of high unemployment, Abdullah has
begun to enforce the policy of Saudization, a program set up twenty years ago to force
Saudi companies to replace their large numbers offoreign workers with qualified Saudi
citizens. The goal of the policy, once the government decided to enforce it around the
turn of the millennium, was to have 70 percent Saudi employment by 2010. As of
December 2005, however, Saudi Arabia’s workforce consisted ofjust 33 percent of Saudi
nationals, compared to 67 percent - or roughly six million - foreign workers.

As

Figure VII illustrates, the disparity between Saudis in the workforce and the
government’s Saudization goals have only grown with time, revealing how much social

Mom Siddiqi.“ I hc Rise and Rise of an F.qiiity Culture." MiMIe Easl(Uo\. 2005): 45.
flrown 20n()
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■ Saud’S as actual oercentage of workforce

I'lie inauniiude id'the foreign w orkforce, which has actually risen since the
implementation of Saudi/ation. should provide some perspective to the casual obser\^er
just how mammoth a task the government faces in providing jobs for its citizens. Over
the last two decades, businesses seeking to survive in the international market have found
it easier to hire foreign workers -● w ho typically have better job skills, a better work ethic,
and will work for lower w ages

than domestic Saudis. Consequently, Abdullah has

enacted new law s that fine companies of more than twenty workers to lie to the
government on their Saudization progress, and, more importantly, he has begun to
address the real problem behind the country's unemployment: education. Since taking
over in the late 1990s. Abdullah has poured money-25 percent of the government’s
entire budget, to be exact.

into education to provide Saudi youths wdtli marketable skills

for its expanding economy. "They're investing very heavily in education. Twenty-five
percent of a budget de\ oted to education is incredible, but they have to spend that much
since their education system is hon endous. Kids can’t find jobs at home, and what’s
really hurling them is that they can’t find jobs abroad either. No one is going to a hire a
Saudi who typically has a bad education and a bad work ethic.
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The former Crown Prince has also culminated 12 years worth of accession talks to
join the World Trade Organization, becoming that organization’s 149'^' member in
December ol 2()()5. Accession according to one senior Saudi economist is "an important
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milestone in the Kingdom's history." Membership will allow for countries to take up to a
75 percent stake in Saudi ser\ ice companies, up to 100 percent in privatized firms, and 51
percent in retail companies. That could spell trouble for the economy’s private sector,
which will be most affected by the influx of foreign competition and the lowering of
tariffs. 1 low e\ er, the banking, insurance, and telecommunications sectors stand to gain
enormously. More importantly, the Saudis will now have WTO protection to export
petrochemicals, an industr>' that w ields a significant comparative advantage over its
competitors because of Saudi Arabia's low oil production costs, without fear offoreign
tariffs. The future of the petrochemical industry is so bright now that Saudi Arabia is a
member of the WTO that it prompted one leading authority on the country to predict
Saudi Arabia will be the world's biggest producer of petrochemicals by 2015. “People
arc investing like crazy in the petrochemical industry, and their production is going to
increase from 45 million tons to 100 million tons in the near feature. In a decade, the
»195

counti*y will be as dominant in that sector as it is in oil now.

Altliough not complete

diversification, steady growth in the petrochemical industry through private investment is
at least a first step towards hedging the Saudi economy away from oil revenues and
rentierism, while also providing increased employment opportunities for Saudi university
graduates.
Underlying its direct economic effects, accession to the WTO will also have
important consequences on the country’s social and political environment. King
Abdullah is locked in a battle to decide the country’s future path ofdevelopment, and his
empowerment of the country’s civil service has served as a counterbalance against the
religious establishment’s dominance of the social discourse over the last twenty years.
There is no doubt among scholars that Abdullah sees the civil service as the future and
the entrenched religious establishment as a barrier to growth. However, the true test will
come when Abdullah’s successor, who will not be as sympatlietic to the civil service,
takes over. “There’s no question that Abdullah is empowering members of the civil
service to counterbalance religious conservatives, but their real test will occur with the
next King. Abdullah has succeeded in giving power to this class of people, but will these
people have the political power to push back against the next King who opposes them?
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That's the real question.”

*
The WTO provides a way for Abdullah to solidify his

current reforms and pro\ ide accountability for future Saudi leaders. “There certainly was
a strong political rationale for accession to the WTO,especially in the political umbrella
that the W'fO prm ides o\ er Saudi leaders.” Membership in an international organization
also allows future Saudi heads of state an excuse when they must reform against the
wishes of their own people. This will be particularly useful to Abdullah in implementing
future reforms in the near future,
fhese reforms, coupled w ith persistently high oil prices, have brightened hopes
for the immediate future of the Saudi economy, as even conservative budget estimates
based on artificially low oil prices are projecting a $14.6 billion surplus for the 2006
fiscal year. Aw ash w ith liquidity, the Saudi stock market has become the Middle East’s
largest by far after grow ing by 100 percent in 2004 and 57 percent in 2005. Real GDP
grew by 7.7 percent in 200.^ and 5.2 percent in 2004, and is estimated at 6.0 percent in
l‘>7

2005 and 4.7 percent in 2006.

Non-oil growth hit a twenty-five year high of 5.7

percent in 2004, and the IMF estimates non-oil growth to be even higher at 6.25 percent
for 2005. The government has used surpluses to unshackle itself from fiscal constraints,
reducing its public debt from $174 billion dollars and 95 percent of its GDP in 2003 to
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$126.7 billion and 60 percent of its GDP only two years later.

The Path to IModernization: Sustainable Development
After two decades of depressed oil prices and budget deficits, Abdullah’s latest
refonns have rekindled hopes for modernization, despite the religious establishment’s
ardent opposition. The impetus behind these refomis and the sense of urgency that is
now tangible among Saudi leaders can be attributed to the country’s underlying problems
that have sent the economy and society teetering on the brink of collapse. King Abdullah
has replaced Saudi leaders’ ‘well-oiled’ complacency with economic liberalization, and
he has wrestled the social and economic discourse away from the religious establishment
and towards the country’s growing civil service, a body that would see tlie creation of
sustainable economie growth and increased participation by the Kingdom in world
affairs. The country’s latest reforms and its economic performance over the last five
years suggest that tlie preconditions necessary for sustainable economic growth are
r#f.
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finally being dc\ eloped. It has succeeded, at least to some degree, in hedging economic
perfonnanee aw a\ from oil and towards a more diversified range ofsectors, and the
immediate future for the non-oil economy looks bright. His push for Saudi accession to
the WTO has also helped to create political accountability for future Saudi rulers.
Abdullah has dex oted funds to education designed to prepare Saudis in the workforce,
rather than for religious training, and he has shifted schooling for girls to the Ministry of
Education from the Ministrx' of Religion. Likewise, he has begun to ease restrictions in
public forms of speech and allowed the country’s first municipal elections in 2005. Over
the last five years. Saudi Arabia has experienced Western development, and the country’s
economy has seen considerable growth.
These reforms demonstrate that, for tlie first time in the government’s
modernization efforts, leaders are passing the impetus for reform from the central
government to the individual. The last two decades of poor economic performance,
culminating in a crisis of dexelopment at the turn of the millennium, have demonstrated
how the government's approach to modernization through massive development projects
in the 1970s and 1980s has proven insufficient in achieving tlie fundamental social,
economic, and political changes necessary to create sustainable growth. Modernization,
unlike Western trends that portray change as arising from the bottom-up due to an
increasingly productive workforce, occurred in Saudi Arabia from the top-down through
projects funded by massive oil revenues. This subtle distinction has enormous
consequences for the prospects for long-term development; the government transformed
society and the economy as far as its reach extended, but it did not address the
individual’s proper role in the economy and in society, nor did it transform the majority s
socioeconomic values. The government’s modernization efforts, therefore, failed to
create institutions in the economy, society, and polity capable of creating consistent
economic growth. Accordingly, the country’s latest reforms should be understood as an
admission that Saudi leaders’ allocation approach to modernization has been ineffective
in achieving one of the stated goals of Saudi leaders for the last fifty years: sustainable
economic growth. King Abdullah understands this to be true, as evidenced by the liberal
reforms that have occun*ed under his rule, and he is empowering the country’s middle
class to lead the Saudi Kingdom into the twenty-first century.
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Future rclbrms also liavc favorable economic implications. The government is
poised to begin an employment drive designed to increase the number of women in the
workforce, a group which currently comprises more than half ofthe Kingdom’s
university population hut has less than twenty percent ofthe jobs, “The Saudi
government is desperate to have women work. Everyday in the press people are talking
about w omen employment. It's become clear that the country needs women to keep its
economy grow ing. Of course there will be a religious backlash, but changes there always
do.

If these t\ pes of economic, social, and political changes continue and business

leaders become convinced that Saudi society has obtained stability and possesses a
continual dri\ e tow aids progress, the country could thrive from an influx offoreign direct
investment that ecnild bring Saudi development more in line witli the modernization
concept, and this multifaceted process of development could become increasingly
prevalent in Saudi society.
1 hat is ncU to say, however, that the long-temi future looks bright. Few ofthese
latest economic, social, and political refomis have been permanently institutionalized,
undermining one of modern society's fundamental preconditions: a cow/mwfl/drive
towards progress. In addition, there is uncertainty regarding who will replace Abdullah,
who turns 82 this year. This future King will go a long way in determining the course of
Saudi development, and the countiy’s civil service, which is behind the nation s rapidly
expanding industrialization, could be suppressed in favor of traditional religious elites.
The increasing secularization of the economy and social institutions related to it has
initiated a battle in the hearts and minds of ordinary Saudis. If economic liberalization
cannot alleviate unemployment - the fundamental problem that is plaguing Saudi society
- before Abdullah's death, then the certainty of future reforms designed to create
sustainable economic growth becomes uncertain. “Scholars are cautiously optimistic
about Saudi development at the moment. But it is certainly premature to say that the
country is on an iiTcvcrsible path towards progress. Right now,the big question
concerning future development - outside of how long Abdullah lives-is whether
Abdullah's reformers can gain enough ground and collect enough power to oppose the
next King who will oppose them. Are these refonns solving enough of the population s
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problems to absorb them into the system? That’s the real question,

In this sense, the

country has readied a critical juncture in its development; it now has the revenues to
continue prtnnoting change, but if these reforms are ineffectively implemented,then they
could all be re\ ersed

sa\ e Saudi Arabia’s accession to the WTO. “Saudi leaders have

to maintain tlieir sense of urgency to correct society’s underlying problems,” Bronson
:ni

stresses.

1 f they don't, then the latest hike in oil prices could just serve as another

undermining innuence in an already volatile country.
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Conclusion
Alihouuh \\'.W. F^ostow is a controversial figure in today’s academic literature,
his modcrni/aiion theory provides some explanation why Saudi Arabian leaders, despite
all their efforts and pots of money, failed to change society at the most fundamental level.
Through the Saudi go\ ernment's top-down approach, oil wealth neither motivated
individual eiti/ens to work hard nor pushed them to possess a continual drive towards
progress. As a result, Rostow's economic stages that manifest themselves through the
interrelatedness tri'the eeonomy, society, and polity never progressed. The modernization
concept, which Rostow and his contemporary Alexander Gerschenkron inspired, only
applies when moderni/ing change is achieved witli the individual as the most basic unit
of change.
As the concept w ould have it, Saudi Arabia failed in its modernization efforts
because it deviated from Rostow's progression ofsocioeconomic change. The very
nature ol' Saudi Arabia's oil wealth transfomied the country into an allocation state that
distributed government funds to its populace rather than a production state that harnessed
its citizens’ productivity. This distinction, although seemingly subtle, has a‘trickle down’
effect on modernization efforts, which have proven unsuccessful because they force
change upon individuals rather than encourage them to reconcile their traditional values
with a secular economy that rew^ards change with material benefits. Consequently, the
massive influx of oil w'ealth resulted in poor economic decision-making by the Royal
Family and discouraged growth independent from the government. Meanwhile, Saudis
came to resent the liberal changes that emerged in society as a result of Royal Family
policies and embraced religion - the one area that the Saudi King had no control over and
the one area on which Saudi identity was built - as a means of stability. Instead ofthe
slow secularization of society as a result of economic change, society became more
entrenched in religion as government revenues imposed culturally liberal changes

on

individuals.
Was Rostow therefore mistaken in his view of modernization because he
presupposed cultural change would occur with steady economic growth? This does not
appear to be the case for Saudi Arabia. Rostow emphasized that non-economic change,
which occurs as economies develop and modernize, was the result of work-reward
causalities

thus there is a fundamental difference between production economies ofthe
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West and rentier eeonomies like Saudi Arabia. He assumed this economic progression
would radically alter non-Westem societies as it had done in the West. WhatRostow
perhaps failed to appreciate was how the ‘trickle down’ process could spark a rise in
cultural conser\ atism. and how theocracies like Saudi Arabia, whose governments’sole
legitimacy to rule is based on the preser\ ation of religion and society, support religious
tenets like Wahhabi Islam that present distinct problems to the liberal changes necessary
to support a modem economy. For Saudi Arabia to succeed in its modernization efforts,
as later critics of rentier economics have pointed out, the country must pursue more
classical deveU^pment models. The masses have to work, tlieir traditional social values
must be indi\ idually transfomied, and the economy must revert back to the economic
foundation of work-reward causation.
Perhaps Rostow w ould not completely blame Saudi leaders for their ineptitude in
creating sustainable economic growth through modernization; indeed, Saudi
policymakers attempted to mimic Western patterns of social advancement and economic
wealth with an economic system that, in its very essence, was neither Western nor
sustainable. It was only a matter of time, then, before Saudi leaders had to confront their
traditional economy, society, and polity given their stated goals ofcreating a modem
economy. King Abdullah is now trying to emulate more classical modernization
processes by hedging the economy away from oil revenues, improving the education
system, pushing for gender equality, and, relatively speaking, sharing power with
individual citizens in certain political structures. Joining tlie World Trade Organization
and empowering the country’s industrial middle-class has also sparked a more classical
modernization movement, and if these policies last long enough to absorb many ofthe
country’s disaffected, then Saudi Arabia could experience more of a bottom-up type of
modernization.
Reforms by King Abdullah that are empowering the individual- not the central
government ~ have initiated a more Rostowian development paradigm, but uncertainty
regarding his length of stay in power has raised into question the long-term stability of
the counti*y. These reforms have only been made possible by two decades of relatively
low oil revenues that have removed other leaders’ ‘well-oiled complacency,’ yet an
enomious amount of work remains to be done if Saudi Arabia is to shape its economy
into a self-sustaining one. Nevertheless, Abdullah’s speeches and recent policy shifts
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ha\c made it abiindantK clear that the Kingdom is now pursuing a different path towards
dex elopment than it did in the 1970s. 1980s, and 1990s, and the economic prospects for
the immediate t'litiire are promising.
Shcmld these soeial and political reforms occur, and Saudi leaders succeed in their
efforts to modernize economically, the countiy'could reap the benefits ofa whole new era
of stability and wealth. A stable Saudi Arabia could play an important role in soothing
already \ cdatile international oil markets, since the Kingdom possesses more than onefourth of the w i^rld's pro\ en oil reserv es and produces more oil and natural gas liquids
than any other cHuintry’ in the w orld. Additionally, the country would be a stabilizing
influence in an already troubled Middle East, as well as show other Arab and Islamic
states that modernity and Islam — e\ en Islam's most conservative sects — are not mutually
exclusive. Domestically, a commitment to Rostowian development could avoid
increased domestic tension in a country with more than twice its 1980 population and
could ground Saudi public opinion in international ones so as to further isolate religious
extremists. Finally, continued reforms could have dramatic effects on the country’s
economy, with increased foreign direct invesmient, higher levels of domestic
employment, and di versirication away from tlie oil industry. With that in mind,the
country has clearly reached a crossroads in its development paradigm, and the next few
years will go a long way in detemiining what the future Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will
look like.
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